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GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS 
 
AADT Annual Average Daily Traffic, total volume of vehicles passing 
through a highway in a year divided by 365 
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer, a project delivery method 
Greenfield 
Project 
A new project, a project that is not an extension, an upgrade or a 




Or MRG, a mechanism that guarantees a minimum traffic revenue 
value 
PPP Contractual agreements formed between a public agency and a private 
sector entity that allow for greater private sector participation in the 
delivery and financing of infrastructure projects 
Project Volatility Measures the uncertainty about project value over time 
Revenue Risk Risk associated with the adverse possibility that the 
project may not generate revenue that is adequate to pay the project 




Or TRC, a mechanism for sharing surplus traffic revenue when the 











Many governments confront a gap between the rising demand for transportation 
infrastructure systems and the financial resources that they have historically used for 
meeting this demand. They are seeking innovative solutions to close this growing gap 
between the cost of much needed transportation infrastructure systems and their available 
financial resources. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model is growingly adopted by 
governments in order to achieve these objectives.  
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) is a form of PPP model that is commonly used for 
financing, development, and operations of transportation projects. In a BOT project, the 
private partner, known as the concessionaire, has the responsibility to finance, design, 
build and operate a facility for a specific period of time under a concession contract. The 
concessionaire typically raises return on its investment through the user charges.  
During their life cycle, BOT projects are subject to a variety of risks. The 
effective mitigation of these risks is a key factor in successful delivery of BOT 
transportation projects. Private investors consider traffic revenue risk, which is stemmed 
from the uncertainty about the future traffic demand, as one of the most important factor 
when they assess the feasibility of a BOT transportation project. They often demand that 
the government partially assume the traffic revenue risk and compensate them if the 
traffic demand falls short of the projections. In order to encourage private investments in 
BOT transportation projects, governments typically agree to provide revenue risk sharing 
mechanisms such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee. In addition to Minimum Revenue 






the concessionaire and government. It makes the government entitled to a share of 
revenue when it grows beyond a specified threshold. The combination of the Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap provisions creates a risk and revenue 
sharing mechanism between the government and the concessionaire.  
BOT participants need a proper valuation method to determine the market value 
of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms and avoid under- 
and over-investments in transportation projects The conventional valuation methods are 
not capable of integrating the uncertainty about future traffic demand in the valuation of 
BOT projects. They also have no capacity to determine the impact of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms on the financial value of the BOT 
project and establish the market value of these mechanisms. This situation presents a 
research opportunity to create new valuation methods that provide the participants in 
BOT projects with proper tools for structuring appropriate risk and revenue sharing 
instruments such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap. 
Recognizing the need, this research focuses on the creation of a real options valuation 
model that can capture the traffic demand uncertainty and accurately price the Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options in BOT projects. 
The body of knowledge on the application of real options in transportation 
infrastructure management is still growing. Prior research has focused on the definition 
and analysis of various kinds of options on transportation projects. However, after 
analyzing the literature on the application of real options in transportation infrastructure 







The current literature on the application of real options in transportation 
infrastructure management does not provide a systematic method for estimating the 
project volatility, which is the most critical input to real options valuation models and 
measures the uncertainty about project value over time.  
Moreover, when it comes to the valuation of real options in transportation 
projects, it is typically impossible to estimate the correct risk-adjusted discount rate that 
reflects the market risks, unique project risks and asymmetric benefit patterns of options. 
The existing literature on the application of real options in transportation infrastructure 
management does not address this problem. Due to these limitations, the application of 
current real options models to the valuation BOT investments under traffic demand 
uncertainty does not lead to the determination of market value of real options.  
Furthermore, the current real options models do not determine the 
concessionaire’s financial risk profile under traffic demand uncertainty. Finally, the 
current models cannot characterize the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and 
Traffic Revenue Cap options on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile. 
The primary objective of this research is to apply the real options theory in order 
to explicitly price Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap under the 
uncertainty about future traffic demand. This research objective is achieved through the 
creation of an investment valuation model for BOT transportation projects under traffic 
demand uncertainty. This model characterizes the long-term traffic demand uncertainty in 
BOT projects and determines the concessionaire’s financial risk profile under uncertainty 
about future traffic demand. Moreover, it utilizes a novel method for estimating the 






pricing approach to determine the value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap options. Finally it presents the appropriate procedure for characterizing the 
impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options on the 
concessionaire’s financial risk profile. In order to illustrate the proposed model and 
highlight its capabilities of the model presented in this research, it is applied to the 
Incheon International Airport Highway (IIAH) project in the Republic of Korea. 
This research contributes to the body of knowledge on the application of real 
options in transportation infrastructure management. It presents an approach that 
combines Monte Carlo simulation and the stochastic processes, and can be used for 
estimating the project volatility. Moreover, it presents a market-based risk-neutral option 
pricing approach in order to determine the fair value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms in BOT projects. 
The proposed model can help public and private sectors better analyze and 
understand the financial risk of BOT projects under traffic demand uncertainty. The 
private sector can use this model to make better entry decisions to BOT highway projects 
considering their expectations about the costs and risks of the project as well as the level 
of revenue guarantee provided by the government. The government can use this model to 
identify the appropriate Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
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maintenance on existing infrastructure (Rall et al. 2010). In other words, there is a 
growing gap between the costs of preserving, modernizing, and expanding the 
transportation infrastructure and the funding available to transportation programs. 
According to National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission 
(2009), the surface transportation system in the U.S. is in financial crisis and the annual 
average funding gap between 2008 and 2035 is expected to be approximately $138 
billion. Likewise, in many countries worldwide, the governments’ traditional funding 
sources are insufficient in providing steady, reliable investment budgets that can finance 
construction, maintenance and expansion of the highway systems (Davies and Eustice 
2005).  
The economic costs of inadequate transportation infrastructure systems are 
enormous. Transportation infrastructure systems are important components of the 
economy impacting the development and welfare of populations. When transportation 
systems are efficient, they provide economic and social opportunities and benefits that 
result in positive multipliers effects such as better accessibility to markets, employment 
and additional investments. When transport systems are deficient in terms of capacity and 
reliability, they can have an economic cost such as reduced or missed opportunities 
(Rodrigue et al. 2009).  
The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) model can help close the growing gap 
between the costs of preserving and expanding the transportation infrastructure and the 
funding available to transportation programs by increasing the involvement of the private 
sector in the delivery of transportation infrastructure and services. The Federal Highway 






agency and a private sector entity that allow for greater private sector participation in the 
delivery and financing of transportation projects.” Through this agreement, the skills and 
assets of each sector (public and private) are shared to deliver the service or facility to the 
public. In addition to resources, each party shares the inherent risks of PPP projects. The 
PPP method has been used in both the developing and developed countries for delivering 
transportation projects. 
According to the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects 
Database (2012), the private investment commitment to transportation projects in 
developing countries has been growing on average since 1990. Figure 1.1 shows the 
annual flow of private capital into the transportation projects in developing countries. 
 
 
Figure  1.1 Transport project investments by private sector in developing countries 
(Source: World Bank) 
 






























countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the United States have also 
utilized the PPP model for delivering the transportation projects. For instance, in the 
United States, the Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA), 
which was enacted in 2000, encourages new revenue streams and private participation for 
the infrastructure development. The act was in order to leverage limited federal resources 
and stimulate private capital investment by providing credit assistance in the form of 
direct loan, loan guarantees, and standby lines of credit to projects of national or regional 
significance (United States Department of Transportation 2002). 
A common form of implementing PPP in transportation is the Build-Operate-
Transfer (BOT) method. The major aim of BOT is to utilize the private sector’s financing 
resources as well as operations expertise in the delivery of public services. Through the 
BOT model the government, and a private entity, called the “concessionaire”, enter into 
an agreement where the concessionaire is responsible to finance, design, build, operate 
and maintain a transportation project on behalf of the government for a predetermined 
period of time that is called the “concession period”. At the end of the concession period, 
the concessionaire transfers the ownership rights back to the government. The 
concessionaire covers its costs and also makes a return on investment, either from a 
revenue stream generated by the project (e.g., traffic revenue) or from the compensation 
by the government. 
Instead of corporate loans, the concessionaire typically finances a BOT project 
through project finance (Yescombe 2002). This implies that the lenders play a key role in 
the delivery of transportation projects using the BOT model. The key BOT participants 






political and socio-economic feasibility of the project; the concessionaire is mostly 
concerned with the financial viability of the project while the lenders are only concerned 
with appraises the concessionaire’s capacity to service its debt. Therefore, in the BOT 
model, the interrelationships among different participants are very complex. The critical 
success factor for a BOT project is the efficient and effective allocation of project risks 
and returns among different project participants (Lu et al. 2000).  
Despite the promising features of the BOT model for developing transportation 
infrastructure, its implementation has not been without trouble. There are numerous 
examples of the financial failure of BOT transportation projects. One of the most 
infamous cases of failure occurred in Mexico, where the Mexican government had to take 
over 23 troubled BOT road projects. The Mexican government paid approximately $5 
billion in outstanding debt to Mexican Banks and approximately $2.6 billion to 
construction companies (Hodges 2006). Similar instances have occurred in many other 
countries including Hungary and Thailand (Cuttaree 2008). These failures may diminish 
the willingness of governments and private investors to participate in BOT transportation 
projects and create a “lose-lose” situation. In this situation, governments lose the 
opportunity to expand, modernize, or rehabilitate the transportation infrastructure 
systems, while private sector participants (e.g., contractors, lenders, management 
companies) miss the opportunity to create value for their shareholders. 
The financial failure of many BOT projects during the operations phase is 
generally attributed to two major issues (Cuttaree 2008; Queiroz 2007): 
1. Improper consideration of the significant uncertainty about future traffic demand in 






2. Inefficient traffic risk and revenue sharing mechanisms between the public and 
private sectors.  
These issues can be traced to the methods used for the financial valuation of BOT 
projects. Traditionally, Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) techniques and most notably the 
deterministic Net Present Value (NPV) analysis have been used for estimating the value 
of investment in the assets that are not actively traded in the markets including highway 
projects (Cheah and Garvin 2009). These conventional methods work only when the 
uncertainties and risks across the lifespan of an investment remain relatively stable. 
Therefore, they are unable to properly evaluate BOT transportation projects since they do 
not explicitly capture and treat the evolving project uncertainties including the 
uncertainty about future traffic demand, which has been identified by several researchers 
as the significant source of revenue risk during the operations phase of BOT projects 
(Brandão and Saraiva 2008; Chiara et al. 2007; Cuttaree 2008; Garvin and Cheah 2004; 
Ho and Liu 2002; Lu et al. 2000; Zhao et al. 2004). There are increasing concerns about 
the validity of results and the reliability of using a conventional NPV analysis approach 
for financial evaluation of BOT highway projects. If the NPV approach was used as a 
basis of decision-making for a BOT project, the financial solvency of the project and 
creditworthiness of the concessionaire could results in project failure. Hence, Kaka and 
AlSharif (2009) indicate that there is a pressing need for developing nondeterministic 
methods for the proper valuation of BOT transportation projects.  
One of the most significant risks in a BOT transportation project is the revenue 
risk which is stemmed from the uncertainty about the future traffic demand. Revenue risk 






sufficient to cover the project costs, to service the debt, and to generate the 
concessionaire’s expected return on investment. Considering the uncertainty about future 
traffic demand, the private investors often request government support instruments that 
are designed to mitigate the revenue risk. 
 One of the most common forms of government support instruments is Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee. By offering Minimum Revenue Guarantee, the government 
guarantees a specific level of revenue for the concessionaire during the concession 
periods and covers some or all of revenue shortfall when, due to insufficient traffic 
demand, the traffic revenues are lower than projected levels (Mandri-Perrott 2006). 
Hence, Minimum Revenue Guarantee is a mechanism for sharing the revenue risk 
between the concessionaire and government. In cases that the government shares the 
revenue risk with the concessionaire, a mechanism can be applied to share the surplus 
traffic revenue when the traffic demand grows significantly beyond the projected levels. 
This mechanism is often referred to as Traffic Revenue Cap (TRC).  
Since traffic revenue risk can prevent the successful implementation of a BOT 
project, proper risk mitigation through appropriate risk and revenue sharing mechanisms 
such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap has strategic relevance 
for both the government and private investors in a BOT project. BOT participants need a 
proper valuation method to determine the market value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms and avoid under- and over-investments in 
transportation projects. The conventional valuation methods are not capable of 
integrating the uncertainty about future traffic demand in the valuation of BOT projects. 






Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms on the financial value of the BOT project and establish 
the market value of these mechanisms. This situation presents a research opportunity to 
develop new valuation methods that provide the participants in BOT projects with proper 
tools for structuring appropriate risk and revenue sharing instruments. Recognizing the 
need, this research focuses on development of a real options valuation model that can 
capture the traffic demand uncertainty and accurately price the Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms in BOT projects. 
State of Knowledge 
The body of knowledge on the application of real options in transportation 
infrastructure management is still growing. Prior research has focused on the definition 
and analysis of various kinds of options on transportation projects in order to only 
demonstrate that the application of real options analysis in transportation infrastructure 
development and management can lead to valuable outcomes. Ho and Liu (2002) present 
an option pricing model for evaluating the impact of the government’s guarantee and the 
developer’s negotiation option on the financial viability of privatized infrastructure 
projects. Zhao et al. (2004) develop a multi-stage stochastic model for decision-making in 
highway development, operations, and rehabilitation, which considers three sources of 
uncertainty, namely, future traffic demand, land price, and highway deterioration, as well 
as their interdependencies. Garvin and Cheah (2004) use an option pricing model to 
capture the strategic value of project deferment for The Dulles Greenway project. Cheah 
and Liu (2006) use Monte Carlo simulation methodology to evaluate government 
guarantees and subsidies as real options and apply it to the case of the Malaysia-






formula for the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project. Minimum Revenue Guarantee options 
combined with the option to abandon in the pre-construction phase are evaluated as a 
series of European style call options in their work. Chiara et al. (2007) model 
governmental guarantees on BOT projects as one of three discrete-exercise real options: 
European, Bermudan, and simple multiple-exercise (Australian) options, and expand the 
least-squares Monte Carlo technique to value these guarantees. Brandao and Saraiva 
(2008) present a real options model for evaluating highway projects with minimum traffic 
guarantees, and apply it to the 1000 mile BR-163 toll road project that links the Brazilian 
Midwest to the Amazon River. The real options model proposed in this study upon and 
contributes to this body of knowledge by overcoming the key limitations of the current 
real options model. 
Gaps in Knowledge 
The appropriate application of real options analysis to valuation of investments in 
transportation projects is conditioned upon overcoming the specific limitations of the 
existing real options models. These limitations are discussed below. 
Estimation of the Project Volatility for Real Options Analysis 
Uncertainty is the key driver of the value of real options (Benaroch et al. 2006; 
Bräutigam et al. 2003). Thus, one of the most critical inputs to any real options valuation 
models is the project volatility that measures the uncertainty about project value over 
time. For investments in transportation infrastructure projects, it is very difficult to 






projects are unique and there is no relevant data on historical or current market prices of 
the transportation projects that can be used as the basis for project volatility estimation. 
The current literature on the application of real options in infrastructure management 
does not provide a systematic method for estimating the project volatility and often 
prescribes the use of assumptions. Therefore, the application of the current real options 
models to the valuation of investments in BOT projects under the uncertainty about 
future traffic demand can lead to an erroneous valuation. There is a pressing need for a 
method that can systematically estimate the project volatility for pricing real options such 
as Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap in BOT transportation 
projects. 
Finding the Market Value of Real Options in Transportation Project 
In order to determine the price of an option, the benefits resulted from exercising 
the option should be discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. The risk-adjusted 
discount rates for options vary widely depending on a several factors including the 
volatility of project due to various market and project risks. When it comes to the 
valuation of real options in transportation projects, it is typically impossible to estimate 
the correct and exact risk-adjusted discount rate that reflects the market risks, project 
risks that are unique to these projects and asymmetric benefit patterns of options 
(Brigham and Ehrhardt 2011; Ford et al. 2002). The existing literature on the application 
of real options in transportation infrastructure management does not address this problem 
and typically suggest the use of approximate discount rates for real options valuation. 






appropriate method that can overcome this challenge and determine the market value of 
options such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap in BOT projects. 
Characterizing the Concessionaire’s Risk Profile under Uncertainty  
Existing real options models do not address several critical questions when it comes to 
the valuation of investments BOT project under traffic demand uncertainty. These models 
do not determine the concessionaire’s financial risk profile under uncertainty about future 
traffic demand in a BOT project. Existing models cannot characterize the impact of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options on the concessionaire’s 
financial risk profile. Also, current models do not determine the likelihood of Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee payment to the concessionaire as well as the likelihood of Traffic 
Revenue Cap payments to the government. There is a need for an appropriate real options 
valuation model that can characterize concessionaire’s risk profile under traffic demand 
uncertainty and, also, enhance the understanding about the impact of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms on the concessionaire’s investment 
value. 
Research Objectives 
The primary objective of this research is to apply the real options theory in order to price 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap risk and revenue sharing 
mechanisms under the uncertainty about future traffic demand. The specific research 
objectives that will be addressed in this research are as follows:  






2. Devise an appropriate method for estimating the project volatility for real options 
analysis; 
3. Devise an appropriate method for finding the market value of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options in BOT projects; and 
4. Create a procedure for characterizing the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and 
Traffic Revenue Cap options on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile. 
 
Organization of Dissertation 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, the rest of this dissertation is 
organized as below. 
Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant literature. The comprehensive literature 
review covers two main research threads: PPP and specifically BOT model for delivering 
transportation infrastructure and options theory. 
Chapter 3 describes the research methodology, discusses theoretical foundation of 
the proposed approach and explains the real options model creation approach. The unique 
features of the proposed real options model that differentiate it from existing models are 
also discussed.  
Chapter 4 presents the application of proposed real options valuation model to 
Incheon International Airport Highway (IIAH) project in Republic of Korea. The 
valuation processes are illustrated in this chapter and a summary of results are provided.  
In Chapter 5 limitations of the proposed real options model and implementation 
barriers to its application are discussed and recommendations for further research in order 
to overcome these limitations and barriers are presented. 
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Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms are specified. These 
limitations can be overcome by using a different approach for evaluating investments 
under uncertainty that is called Real Options. An analysis of the literature on the 
application of real options in transportation infrastructure systems is provided and the 
limitations of existing real options models are identified.  
Public-Private Partnership (PPP) 
Concept of Public-Private Partnership 
Across the globe, many public authorities face constant demand for developing 
new transportation infrastructure projects and for funding the renewal, maintenance and 
operation of existing transportation systems. Competition for securing the financial 
resource in order to satisfy the transportation infrastructure demand is very intense. 
Transportation infrastructure projects should not only compete with each other to secure 
funds, but they should also compete with other projects that demand public sector finance. 
This creates large and growing gap between transportation infrastructure needs and the 
resources that governments can invest in maintaining, expanding and modernizing these 
systems. Many countries confront this transportation infrastructure deficit that is 
demonstrated by evidences such as congested roads and bridges in urgent need for 
rehabilitation and repair. 
These problems in turn impose considerable costs on the society and a cause a 
variety of issues from lower productivity and reduced competitiveness to an increased 
number of accidents (Rodrigue et al. 2009). This has forced the governments to explore 






Trombka 2010). Since the late 1980s, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) have attracted 
much attention in various countries as a possible means that the governments can utilize 
to close infrastructure gaps, contribute to the economic integration, accelerate economic 
growth and sustainable development, and expand local access to international markets 
(Office of Policy and Governmental Affairs 2007). Numerous examples of PPP 
transportation projects exist worldwide. In the United States, 24 states and the District of 
Columbia have so far used PPP process to help finance and deliver at least 96 
transportation projects worth a total $54.3 billion (Reinhardt 2011). The use of PPP 
model has expanded the range of capital sources that can be used for financing 
infrastructure transportation projects (Figure 2.1). 
 
 
Figure  2.1 Capital sources currently utilized for financing transportation infrastructure 
 
The Federal Highway Administration (2008) defines PPP as “contractual 
agreements formed between a public agency and a private sector entity that allow for 
greater private sector participation in the delivery and financing of transportation 


















such as financial assets, efficient management, propensity to innovative and 
entrepreneurship are combined with the resources of the public sector in order to achieve 
efficiency levels that are superior to an entirely public or entirely private project (Valila 
2005).  
PPP contracts are generally long-term contracts with duration increasing with the 
level of financial involvement of the private sector in the provision of investments. In 
addition, PPP projects are often large in magnitude and face complex risks beyond the 
scope normally experienced in typical construction projects. To ensure the success of a 
PPP, the project risks should be borne by the party that can manage it best. For this 
reason, in PPP projects many of the risks traditionally borne by the government are 
transferred to the private investors. The private investors want to be assured that the PPP 
project can provide competitive rates of return commensurate with a financial rate of 
return similar to alternative projects of comparable risk. Therefore, before entering into 
contractual arrangements, they appraise the risks involved in the project. If the level of 
such risks are very high and appropriate risk mitigation mechanisms are not available, 
they will likely withdraw from the project (Esty 2003; Yescombe 2002). In other words, 
participation of the private investors in PPP projects is conditioned upon the appropriate 
mitigation of the project’s risks. This implies that risk management and risk mitigation 








Potential Benefits of Public-Private Partnerships  
Public-Private Partnerships present numerous advantages both for the public 
partner and the private partner. Through PPP projects, the private sector can get access to 
new investment opportunities in various sectors, increase the business activities, enjoy 
better margins and get more long-term revenues (Shaoul 2009). The implications for 
governments have been getting much more attention in the literature (Alexandersson and 
Hultén 2010). By using PPP arrangements governments can address the common issues 
often associated with public sector procurement including constrained budget, high 
construction costs, time overruns, operational inefficiencies, poor design and community 
dissatisfaction (Feigenbaum 2011; Latham and Trombka 2010; Mustafa 1999). The 
advantages for the public partner may be summarized into the following broad areas: 
Project Funding 
Public-Private Partnerships offer alternative ways to fund and deliver the projects 
that otherwise would not be built due to the limitation of funding available through 
conventional sources (Feigenbaum 2011). PPPs provide the potential to utilize the private 
sector capabilities to provide more favorable financing options and to secure such 
financing in a much quicker timeframe (National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 
2003). Therefore, governments can use PPPs to deliver much needed transportation 
infrastructure, control their borrowing, and maintain the sustainability of their financial 
position (Heller 2005; The World Bank 2005). In addition, PPP contracts sometimes 
stipulate a large upfront payment that local officials can use to close budget gaps or free 






Public-Private Partnerships enable better allocation of public resources over time. 
Using PPPs, the costs of various infrastructure investments can be spread over the 
lifetime of the assets. This allows infrastructure projects to be delivered years earlier 
compared with the pay-as-you-go financing typical of many infrastructure projects 
(Alexandersson and Hultén 2010; Deloitte Research 2011). Finally, it is expected that the 
involvement of private sector in the financing of transportation infrastructure systems 
will increase fiscal accountability and transparency, reduce corruption and create 
incentives for the prudent management of public expenditure (Shaoul 2009; United 
Nations 2000). 
Quality 
By using the Public-Private Partnership contracts, governments can utilize the 
private sector expertise, innovation and efficiency in the development of infrastructure 
systems (Shaoul 2009). Transportation infrastructure projects are typically complex; the 
private sector carries special expertise that can be utilized effectively in order to improve 
the project quality. PPP arrangements can also provide the potential to maximize the use 
of innovative technology and the ability to select the best materials in order to improve 
the quality of a project (Latham and Trombka 2010). The government can regulate the 
level of service quality that the facility provides to the public by incorporating 
satisfaction metrics and performance-related payments into the contract. These measures 
incentivize the private partner to improve the service quality and maintain the asset 
according to highest standards (Alexandersson and Hultén 2010; Shaoul 2009). Finally, 
during the operation phase, the competition for higher market share creates additional 








Typically, PPP contracts encompass a wide range of activities including financing, 
design, construction, and operations and maintenance provision. When there is a single 
point of responsibility for these activities, there are opportunities to achieve better overall 
solutions and exploit economies of scale in order to reduce the costs (Emecheta 2010; 
Hart 2003). In addition, government may occasionally encounter specific types of project 
that need specialized knowledge or technology. In such cases, the cost reduction may also 
be achieved through the use of specialized technology, knowledge and expertise held by 
the private sector firms regarding these projects. 
Risk Sharing 
Project contracts should be designed so that each risk associated with the project 
is allocated to the partner best suited to handle it. Compared to the public sector, the 
private sector is typically more capable of managing most of the project risks (Latham 
and Trombka 2010; Shaoul 2009). By using the Public-Private Partnership model, a 
government can reduce its exposure to these risks by transferring them to the private 
sector, which will act vigorously to safeguard the profitability of the project (Emecheta 
2010). Nevertheless, specific risks such as policy changes and natural disaster can still be 
better managed by the public sector. There are also some risks that neither the 
government nor the private sector can fully control. These risks are typically shared by 
both partners including the demand risk (Alexandersson and Hultén 2010). Allocating 






materialize, thus reducing the overall project risk. In addition, the up-front consideration 
of risk in a PPP agreement may also facilitate less costly and timely risk mitigation (Rall 
et al. 2010). 
Project Delivery Schedule 
Public-Private Partnerships have a solid track record of on-time as well as on-
budget delivery (Deloitte Research 2011; HM Treasury 2003; Price 2000; Shaoul 2009). 
The results of research on 12 completed, large-scale (greater than $100 million) PPP 
transportation projects in North America indicate the schedule overruns for the PPP 
sample averaged -0.44%, compared to 11.04% schedule overruns for design-build 
projects and 4.34% schedule overruns for publicly funded large-scale design-bid-build 
highway projects (Chasey et al. 2012). Also, according to a British study, only 24% of all 
new PPP projects are running late, compared to 70% of the public projects (National 
Audit Office 2003).  
The reason is that, in a PPP project, there is a single point of responsibility for 
activities such as design and construction. Therefore, these activities may be carried out 
in parallel rather than sequentially in order to shorten the project’s completion time 
(Alexandersson and Hultén 2010). Incentives such as the possibility of generating 
revenues from operating the completed facility as well as other contractual mechanisms 
may also provide motivations to expedite the project delivery.  
Life-cycle Efficiency  
Public-Private Partnerships can lower the cost of infrastructure systems by 






PPP model facilitates an integrated approach to project delivery in which a single entity is 
responsible for multiple project phases such as design, construction, operations and 
maintenance. In theory, this gives the private investors the incentive to reduce costs 
across a facility’s entire lifecycle through a variety of means such as innovative design 
that reduces construction costs, high-quality project delivery that lowers the cost of 
maintenance and improvements, or maintenance that avoids costly rebuilds and 
rehabilitations during the facility lifecycle. 
Moreover, since the private sector is often responsible for the design, construction 
and future service of a project, the public can be assured that the project goals are reached 
and kept in line with the price agreed upon at the time of signing the contract 
(Partnerships British Columbia 2003). This can reduce the possibility for large 
unexpected cost increases across a facility’s entire lifecycle. In fact, evidence suggest that, 
compared to the projects executed by the public sector, PPP projects stay within their 
estimated budgets far more often (Alexandersson and Hultén 2010).  
Concerns Related to the Utilization of Public-Private Partnerships 
Public-Private Partnerships projects are typically complicated projects. Typically, 
these projects are long-term investments with two distinct phases in their lives; the 
development phase and the operation phase. These two phases are very different in 
character and may involve different challenges. Experts have identified several potential 
concerns related to the utilization of PPP for delivering transportation infrastructure 
systems. Some of these concerns pertain to the increased private sector involvement in 






enabling legislation and contract terms, or through meticulous project evaluation and 
selection, procurement, and oversight. 
Loss of Public Control and Flexibility 
Typically, Public-Private Partnerships contracts require the long-term 
commitments of the involved public and private parties. No contract can be crafted well 
enough to predict the public’s long-term demand and contingencies. Therefore, many 
experts warn that PPP agreements may reduce the government’s flexibility to make 
necessary policy adjustments since there is a concern that such changes may affect the 
PPP project. In addition, some critics are concerned that the long-term commitment of the 
government to the PPP contract can be exploited strategically by the private investors 
seeking renegotiation or contract termination. Another issue that raises concerns about 
potential loss of public control is the non-compete clauses that sometimes incorporated in 
the PPP contracts. These clauses prohibit or limit the potential for developing new 
transportation facilities that may draw traffic from the PPP project. They can place the 
government in a potentially disadvantageous position by limiting its ability to develop the 
infrastructure system in response to the changes in demand over time (Alexandersson and 
Hultén 2010; Emecheta 2010; Rall et al. 2010). 
Private Profits at the Expense of Public 
Critics have also expressed concerns that private sector participants in Public-
Private Partnership projects may seek a profit at the expense of public. The concern is 
that the private partner may skip required maintenance and repairs to boost profits or 






There are also concerns that the PPP contracts give private partners too much discretion 
to raise toll rates and enforce high fees. Another related concern is related to the 
unsolicited PPP project. There is a concern that unsolicited bids encourage public 
agencies to give higher priority to projects that are more profitable to private investors 
rather than those projects that are the most beneficial to the public (Rall et al. 2010).. 
Risk of Bankruptcy or Default 
There are also concerns about the way the private partner’s default affects the 
government. Problems can arise in cases where the government is owed money at the 
time of default or the cases where the government is at financial risk since it has 
guaranteed the private investors’ loans (Emecheta 2010; Rall et al. 2010).  
Transparency 
Transparency is mostly concerned with providing the legislators and the general 
public with adequate opportunities to review the project and actively participate in the 
decision-making process. The challenge is to keep a balance between maintaining 
confidentiality during the proposal review process in order to protect the proprietary 
information provided by bidders and providing adequate information to stakeholders 
regarding the implications of accepting each proposal (Priemus and Flyvbjer 2008; Rall 
et al. 2010) 
Environmental Issues 
There are concerns that Public-Private Partnerships may not sufficiently safeguard 
the environment. For instance, one concern is that the private entities may choose less 






There are also concerns that the use of private financing may exempt the PPP projects 
from environmental protections laws and regulations such as the National Environmental 
Policy Act (NEPA) in the U.S. that are only enforceable to publicly-funded projects (Rall 
et al. 2010).  
Sources of Financing in Public-Private Partnership Projects 
Public-Private Partnership projects typically involve financing from various 
sources in some combination of equity and debt. This section presents a brief overview of 
the main sources of financing in PPP projects. 
Debt  
Debt financing involves borrowing the funds required for the project. The 
investment return for debt holders is limited to the interest earned on the principal. Debt 
can be obtained from many sources, including commercial lenders, institutional investors, 
export credit agencies, bondholders and sometimes the government. Though the returns 
for debt holders are limited to the interest, they have a senior claim to income and assets 
of the company or project. Different rights or claims to cash flow may also exist among 
different debt holders. Subordinated debt holders are junior to general or senior creditors 
and will only be paid once they have been satisfied (The World Bank 2011). Repayment 
of debt is generally tied to a fixed or floating rate of interest and a program of periodic 
payments. Below are some of the most common forms of debt financing. 
1. Bonds: Bonds are long-term interest bearing debt instruments generally purchased by 






bond financing provides the ability to raise debt directly from investors in public 
capital markets, rather than using commercial lenders as intermediaries. There are 
many different institutional investors that purchase these bonds including pension 
funds, insurance companies, and fund managers. Typically, there is a manager that 
assists the borrower with the process of marketing the bonds. There is also trustee that 
holds rights and acts on behalf of the investors, stopping any one investor from 
independently declaring a default. Due to restrictions on investment mandates, many 
institutional investors may require a credit rating for the project from an independent 
credit rating agency(Gawlick 2007). Therefore, rating agencies often assess the 
riskiness of the project, and assign a credit rating to the bonds which will signal to 
bond purchasers the attractiveness of the investment and the price they should pay. 
Bond financing generally provides lower borrowing costs, if the credit rating for the 
project is sufficiently strong. Therefore, rating agencies are usually consulted to 
maximize the credit rating for the project. Bond financing provides a number of 
benefits to projects including lower interest rates, longer maturity and more 
liquidity(Gawlick 2007; The World Bank 2011). 
 
2. Commercial loans: Commercial loans are funds that are lent by commercial banks 
and other financial institutions. Typically, these loans are securitized by the PPP 
project’s underlying assets. While the financial strength of the borrower (i.e., project 
company or concessionaire) is often the principle basis for making decision on the 
structure of the loan, for PPP projects many financial institutions give greater 
consideration to a project's expected cash flow(Gawlick 2007). Commercial loans are 






have the rights to project assets and cash over equity and subordinated debt holders. 
3. Subordinated loans: Subordinated loans are secondary (subordinated) to commercial 
loans or other senior debt holders in their claim on assets but have the priority over 
equity. As a result, the rate of return on subordinated loans is higher than commercial 
or senior debt as the perceived risk is higher (Gawlick 2007). 
Equity  
Equity financing is long-term capital provided by an investor in exchange for 
shares, representing ownership in the company or project. Typically, the equity 
contributors to a PPP project are the project participants, the government, and third party 
private investors such as institutional investors and other governments. The equity 
contributions are typically in form of share capital and other shareholder funds. A key 
feature that distinguishes equity from debt is the holder’s claim to assets. Equity 
contributors hold the lowest priority compared to other funding contributors to the 
project. Therefore, other contributors such as lenders will have the right to project assets 
and revenues before the equity contributors can obtain any return (Gawlick 2007; The 
World Bank 2011). In other words, in the event of default, equity holders’ claim on the 
income and assets is secondary to debt holders. Equity contributors bear the highest risk. 
However, in exchange for taking higher risks, equity holders have unlimited potential 
returns compared to debt holders whose investment returns are limited to the interest 
earned on the debt.   
Mezzanine 






project, mezzanine contributions are accorded lower priority than senior debt but higher 
priority than equity (Gawlick 2007; The World Bank 2011). The utilization of mezzanine 
contributions, which are typically characterized as quasi‑equity, allows the project 
company to maintain greater levels of debt to equity ratio in the project, although at a 
higher cost than senior debt (Gawlick 2007). Mezzanine financing can be received from 
shareholders, commercial lenders, and institutional investors. Mezzanine contributors 
will be compensated for the added risk they take either by receiving higher interest rates 
on loans than the senior debt contributors and/or by receiving partial participation in the 
project profits or the capital gains achieved by project equity (The World Bank 2011). 
Examples of mezzanine contributions are subordinated agreements and preferred shares. 
Subordination involves a lender agreeing not to be paid until another lender to the same 
borrower has been paid, whether in relation to specific project revenues or in the event of 
insolvency. Subordination can be achieved either by contract or through corporate 
structuring. Preferred shares have a fixed rate dividend similar to a debt instrument 
however, unlike debt, payment ultimately rests at the discretion of management and 
failure to pay dividends will not force a company into default. However, dividends to 
preferred shareholders must be paid out prior to any distributions to holders of equity. In 
case of default, holders of preferred shares are junior to debt holders, but senior to 
ordinary equity shareholders(Gawlick 2007). 
Innovative Financing Mechanisms 
In many cases, in addition to the commonly-used financing mechanisms available 
in capital markets, various innovative financing mechanisms exist that can be utilized in 






Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) federal credit 
assistance, private activity bonds and state infrastructure banks provide the private 
investors in transportation projects with access to low-interest or tax-exempt debt. These 
mechanisms are intended to reduce the financing costs for private investors to levels that 
are more competitive with state and municipal financing rates. Table 2.1 provides an 
overview of the innovative finance mechanisms that can be utilized in PPP transportation 
projects.  
Table  2.1 Innovative financing mechanisms that can be utilized to support PPP 






Federal-Aid Fund    
Management Tools
 Advance Construction (AC) and Partial Conversion of
Advance Construction (PCAC)
 Federal-Aid Matching Strategies
Flexible Match
Tapered Match
Toll Credits (Soft Match)
Program Match
Third-Party Donations
Using Other Federal Funds as Match
Federal Debt 
Financing Tools 
 Grant Anticipation Revenue Vehicles (GARVEEs)
 Private Activity Bonds (PABs)
Federal Credit 
Assistance Tools
 Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation
Act (TIFIA)
 State Infrastructure Banks (SIBs)
 Section 129 Loans
Public-Private 
Finance Mechanisms
 Pass-Through Tolls / Shadow Tolling
 Availability Payments
Other Mechanisms
 Non-Federal Bonding and Debt Instruments
 Value Capture Arrangements such as Tax Increment
Financing (TIF)






General Patterns of Financing Public-Private Partnership Projects  
A significant portion of funds required for a PPP project is typically obtained 
through project financing. The term project financing essentially means “to finance a 
particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to look initially to the cash flows 
and earnings of that economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be 
repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for the loan” (Nevitt and 
Fabozzi 2000). The definition highlights three important features of project financing. 
First, the financing is carried out through an economic unit. In other words, project 
financing involves an organizational decision to create an economic entity that will 
assume the ownership of project. Second, debt service depends upon the cash flows 
generated through the operation of the project by the economic unit. This implies that all 
the relevant contracts are important to ensure the realization of anticipated cash flows. 
Third, liquidation is limited to the assets of the economic unit and, thus, debt financing is 
based on a non- or limited recourse basis (Ye 2009).  
There are three patterns of financing PPP projects: financing based on a single-
entity organizational structure, financing based on a two-entity organization structure and 
financing based on multiple-entity organization structure. 
Financing Based on a Single-Entity Organizational Structure 
In a single-entity structure for financing infrastructure projects, a single-purpose 
economic entity (e.g., project company or concessionaire) is established. The sole 
purpose of this economic entity is to develop the project. This entity, which acts as the 






incorporated company, a contractual joint venture, a partnership or a trust.  
This economic entity enters into contracts with different project participants for 
the financing, design, construction and operation of the project. For instance, it may enter 
into a loan agreement with lenders in order to finance the project. Also, depending on the 
complexity of project and capabilities of the economic entity, the project can be operated 
by the economic entity or a specialized operator that is hired for this purpose. The 
majority of transportation projects are developed by companies that have the capabilities 
required for operating the project once the construction is over (Ye 2009). 
Financing Based on a Two-Entities Organizational Structure 
In a dual-entity structure, two economic units are established to carry out different 
tasks or different parts of a project (Figure 2.2). Various situations may force the 
utilization of a dual-entity structure. One of the common instances is when a project 
involves a lot of lenders/investors with different requirements. In these cases, one of the 
economic units will be responsible for financing (e.g. a trust borrowing vehicle) while the 
other will be responsible for managing the project (e.g. a project company). An economic 
entity is specially established as a borrowing vehicle to raise funds for the project so that 
the project company can avoid dealing with a lot of lenders/investors directly. Then the 
project company enters into a loan agreement with the borrowing vehicle. Similar to the 
mono-entity structure, the project company in a dual-entity structure may act as an 
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A framework proposed by Miller (2000) can be used to define different types 
of PPP model and compare and contrast them against traditional models for funding and 
delivery of infrastructure projects such as Design-Bid-Build (DBB). In this framework, 
project delivery and project finance methods are distinguished and compared as 
interdependent variables (Figure 2.3).  
The metric that is used for project delivery methods is the degree to which the 
project elements (i.e., design, construction, and operations and maintenance) are 
separated from each other. Accordingly, there are two general choices regarding the 
project delivery methods.   
1. Segmented: The three key elements of infrastructure projects are delivered separately 
from each other. In this case, distinctions remain between capital budgets for the 
initial delivery of projects and the operating budgets for long term operations and 
maintenance; and 
2. Combined: The three key elements of infrastructure projects are delivered together – 
integrated with each other. Distinctions between capital budgets and operating 
budgets for these projects are eliminated. All “Public Private Partnerships” use 
combined delivery methods. 
The metric that is used for project finance methods is the degree to which the 
government assumes the direct financial risk for delivering the project. Accordingly, 
there are two general sources of financing for projects. 
1. Direct financing: Government pays for projects by using public resources such as 






2. Indirect financing: The funding required for the project will be provided by the 
private sector investors. In this case, funds required for the design and construction of 
the project are generally acquired based on the ability of project to produce revenue 
that is sufficient to pay the project costs, service the debt, and generate the expected 
rate of return for the investors. 
Miller’s framework is comprised of two perpendicular axes. The horizontal 
axis represents the continuum of delivery methods measured by the degree to which 
typical elements are segmented or combined with one another. The vertical axis 
represents the continuum of financing methods measured by the degree of which 
government assumes the financial risk for producing, operating, and maintaining the 
project throughout its life cycle. Figure 2.3 illustrates the placement of different types of 
PPP arrangements as well as more traditional approaches to the delivery of infrastructure 
projects on Miller’s proposed framework. As it is clear, various types of PPP projects are 
included in quadrant II where the project development, finance, design, construction, 
maintenance, and operation are performed by a single entity. In addition, for most PPP 
models, the private participants themselves assume all the risk and take the responsibility 








Figure  2.3 Miller’s framework (Source: Miller (2000)) 
 
Types of PPP Contracts 
Estache and Serebrisky (2004) provide a holistic definition of Public-Private 
Partnerships that encompasses all types projects with private participation in provision of 
infrastructure systems. In their view, the level of private sector involvement in 
infrastructure systems delivery might range from a purely service provision, without 
recourse to public facilities, through service provision based on public facilities usage, up 
to the ownership of a publicly-used facility (Figure 2.4). For each project, the appropriate 
type of PPP contract should be selected based on a variety of issues such as: the degree of 
control desired by the government; the government’s capacity to provide the desired 
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monitoring and regulation; and the availability of financial resources from public and 
private sources (Gentry and Fernandez 1998). The most common types of PPP contracts 
are discussed below. 
 
 




Under this model, the government grants a private entity a leasehold interest in a 
publicly financed existing facility for specified time. Usually the private sector pays an 
upfront fee in return for future generated revenue. The private sector operates and 
maintains the facility in accordance with the terms of the lease (Latham and Trombka 
2010; National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 2011). 
Concession 
The government grants a private entity the exclusive rights to operate and 
maintain an existing facility over a long period in accordance with performance 
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the asset, but the private operator retains ownership over any improvements made during 
the concession period(Estache and Serebrisky 2004). 
Divestiture 
The government transfers all or part of a publicly financed facility to the private 
sector indefinitely. Generally, the government includes certain conditions on the sale to 
require that the asset be improved and services be continued (Deloitte Research 2011; 
National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 2011). 
Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) 
Under the Build-Transfer-Operate (BTO) model, a single contract is awarded for 
the design, construction, and operation of a facility (National Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships 2011). Once the facility is completed, the title for the new facility is 
transferred to the government, while the private partner operates the facility for a 
specified period (Deloitte Research 2011). This is contrary to the BOT model where the 
transfer of the title for the facility takes place at the end of the concession period. The 
private partner must meet all agreed upon performance standards relating to physical 
condition and service quality. The potential benefits of the BTO approach are the 
increased incentives for the delivery of a higher quality plan and project because the 
private sector partner is contractually responsible for the performance of facility for a 
specified period of time after construction is completed. 
Build-Own-Operate (BOO) 
Under the Build-Own-Operate (BOO) model, the design, construction, operation, 






difference between the BOO model and BTO or BOT models is that the private partner 
retains the ownership of facility. Therefore, the potential benefit associated with a BOO 
approach is that the contractor is assigned all operating demand risk and any surplus 
revenues for the life of the facility (National Council for Public-Private Partnerships 
2011; Office of Policy and Governmental Affairs 2007). 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
Under the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) model, the private project team, which 
is also known the “concessionaire”, is primarily responsible for the financing, design, 
construction, and operation of the facility for a specified time under a long-term contract. 
the concessionaire, is typically a consortium of private companies with resources and 
expertise in different functions such as design, construction, financing, operations, and 
maintenance (Federal Highway Administration 2008; Office of Policy and Governmental 
Affairs 2007). The major aim of BOT is to utilize these resources and expertise in the 
development of infrastructure systems. The concessionaire retains ownership of the 
facility and operates it for a specified period of time according to the concession contract. 
The revenue generated from the operation of the facility is typically retained by the 
concessionaire and is expected to be sufficient for both repaying the debt and to 
providing the required return on investment (National Council for Public-Private 
Partnerships 2011). The concessionaire transfers the facility to the government at the end 
of the concession lifetime under the agreed terms in the contract (Federal Highway 
Administration 2008; Office of Policy and Governmental Affairs 2007). A potential 
benefits of using a BOT approach is the increased incentive for the delivery of a higher 






operation of the facility for a specified time period after construction (Office of Policy 
and Governmental Affairs 2007). Another potential benefit of the BOT approach is the 
transfer of the project risks to the private sector partner. Figure 2.5 illustrates the 
contractual structure of a typical BOT project.  
 
 
Figure  2.5 Contractual structure of a typical BOT project (Source: World Bank (2011)) 
 
 
The BOT model is one of the most common forms of implementing PPP in 
transportation projects. From 2001 to 2006, BOTs made two-third of private highway 
investments ($18 billion) in developing countries (Queiroz and Izaguirre 2008). Common 
























BOT Transportation Projects 
Public-Private Partnership transportation projects often have a BOT type of 
arrangement, which is designed to attract private participation in financing, design, 
construction, and operation of transportation infrastructure systems. BOT transportation 
projects are typically large-scale and complex structures comprising multiple 
interdependent agreements among the various participants. These agreements can be seen 
as risk-management mechanisms, which have been designed to optimally allocate the 
BOT risks by shifting them to those parties best able to appraise and control them 
(Brealey et al. 1996).  
Key Participants in a BOT Transportation Project  
As shown in Figure 2.5, there are various parties involved in a BOT transportation 
project. These participants are identified below. 
Concessionaire 
The concessionaire is usually comprised of a group of companies interested in 
undertaking the design, construction and operation and maintenance of the infrastructure 
project or facility. The concessionaire also has an equity stake in the project. The 
concessionaire holds the responsibilities for the operation of facility during the specified 
concession period wherein the private investors try to recover their investments and earn 
profits (Llanto 2007). The concessionaire covers its costs and makes a return on 
investment, either from a revenue stream generated by the project (e.g., traffic revenue) 
or from the compensation by the government. Government compensation arrangements 






based on traffic levels, capacity provided by the project, or other performance measures 
as defined by contract. In these cases, the private partner typically does not charge the 
end users any direct user fees or tolls (Irwin 2003; Rall et al. 2010). In many other 
situations, the revenue stream generated by form direct user fees and tolls are the primary 
sources for recovering the private sector investment.  
Contractor 
BOT transportation projects involve large-scale building and construction 
activities. In some cases, the concessionaire hires a contractor through a fixed-price 
design-build contract and uses it services to construct the facility. In other instances, the 
contractor is part of the consortium that forms the concessionaire. In order to facilitate 
financing, the contractor takes responsibility of the design risk, by assuming risks for 
longer period of time as opposed to standard construction contracts of shorter life (Llanto 
2007). The contractor also hires subcontractors, suppliers and consultants. 
Operator 
The concessionaires generally use the services of an operator, which has the 
required knowledge of the business and the local environment, in order to manage and 
operate the facility. Usually, the operator is required to maintain at certain performance 
and service quality level and produce the maximum revenue from the operation of 
facility. The operator can be one of the entities forming the concessionaire. 
Lenders 
Usually, the equity contribution from the shareholders of concessionaire 






addition to the shareholders, there are two other broad categories of equity providers that 
may contribute to the financing of the project:  
1. Those that have a direct interest in the operation of the project such as contractors, 
operators or the government itself, and 
2. Those that are solely involved as equity investors such as public shareholders and other 
institutional investors (Llanto 2007). 
Often, institutional investors act as lenders and provide the majority of the 
funding needed for the project. Lenders are typically commercial banks, insurance 
companies, multilateral lending institutions, and similar institutional investors. They 
create a syndication that provides credit financing to the concessionaire. Before lending 
money, lenders need to be very confident that the project can be completed on time and 
on budget, capable of operating as designed, and able to generate enough net cash flow to 
completely service the debt. As a result, the concessionaire may negotiate with the 
government for certain guarantees or credit enhancements to make the project attractive 
to the lenders. In addition, the concessionaire may allow lenders assume an active role 
not only in the financial arrangement but also in the planning and execution of the BOT 
projects (Merna and Njiru 2002). 
Suppliers 
Manufacturers and suppliers, provide raw material and equipment required for the 
project through a supply contract. In some cases, the manufacturers and suppliers of raw 
materials and equipment participate in the financing of a BOT project. The equity 
contribution to the project could be beneficial for the suppliers in achieving the goal of 






equipment necessary for the development and operation of the project. Therefore, the 
concessionaire is protected against the risk that the project will not risk its intended goals 
due to the lack of essential materials and equipment input. Not all BOT projects require a 
form of supply contracts since in many cases, concessionaires can rely on market 
availability of required materials and equipment (Delmon 2005).  
Insurance 
It is helpful to have insurance advisors to consider when insurance can be used to 
mitigate some of the project risks. The government also needs insurance advisors to 
determine if there are risks that need insurance coverage. 
Risks in BOT Projects 
Although it is theoretically assumed that BOT projects will bring many benefits to 
the public and private participants, evidence suggest that the financial expectations of 
BOT investors are not always fulfilled (Cuttaree 2008; Erhardt and Irwin 2004; Queiroz 
2007). The financial success of a BOT project relies on the ability of project to service 
the debt and generate the expected equity rate of return. Therefore, it is imperative that 
any risks that can endanger the project’s profitability are assessed and eventually 
mitigated (Hoffman, 2001).  
Risk can be defined as the probability of occurring of an event during a specific 
period of time that causes the project outcomes to deviate from the expected values 
(Mandri-Perrott 2010). Therefore, three essential elements of risk are the probability of 






uncertainty. Uncertainty is the state of shortage of certainty with implies the lack of 
adequate information. A risk occurs when either the consequence of an activity or 
decision is uncertain in terms of probability, impact or time (Boothroyd and Emmett 
1996). Therefore, risk modeling of is primarily concerned with investigating and treating 
the uncertainty (Akintoye et al. 2003). 
The BOT transportation projects are particularly subject to a variety of financial 
risks due to the large initial costs, high irreversibility (sunk costs), extended contract 
duration, and high contract complexity due to the involvement of several parties with 
different objectives and constraints (Checherita and Gifford 2007). For BOT 
transportation projects, appropriate mitigation of the financial risks by the project 
participants is one of the most critical success factors (Arthur Andersen and Enterprise 
LSE 2000; Chiara and Garvin 2007; Grant 1996; Hardcastle et al. 2005; Qiao et al. 2001). 
In fact, many BOT projects fail due to high levels of risks and the inefficient risk sharing 
mechanisms between the public and private sectors (Cuttaree 2008; Queiroz 2007).  
Several methods for classifying project finance risks have been proposed. These 
methods classify project finance risks in variety of ways including: inherent or external 
risks, controllable or uncontrollable risks, unique (diversifiable) or market (non-
diversifiable) risks, upside and downside risks, dependent or independent risks, 
corporation or project-related risks, and management-related or technical risks. In a BOT 
project, risks can also be classified according to timing of their occurrence in the BOT 
project life-cycle. Based on this categorization, the BOT highway risks are classified into 
three categories, 1) Risks that exist in the design and construction phase of BOT project; 






throughout the BOT project life-cycle. 
Yescombe (2002) takes a different perspective and classifies the risks according 
to the environment from which they stem. In this approach risks are divided into three 
categories: Macro-economic risks, Political risks and Commercial risks.  
Macro-economic risks 
Macro-economic risks are the risks related to the external economic factors not 
directly related to the project. Examples of these factors are inflation, currency exchange 
rates and interest rate.  
Political risks 
Political risks, which are also known as country risks, are the risks related to the 
effects of government actions or political force majeure events such as war and civil 
disturbance. The political risks can impair the ability of project to generate earning. 
Examples of political risks that impact BOT projects include cancelling the concession 
unilaterally, imposing new taxes or regulations that seriously reduce the project value for 
investors, refusing to accept the tolls agreed in the concession agreement; and prohibiting 
investors from taking revenue out of the country.  
Commercial risks 
Commercial risks, which are also known as project risks, are the risks specific to 
the project itself and the market in which it operates. Therefore, an investor that 
undertakes two projects with different characteristics (location, scope, organization, 
duration, and industry) in the same country and under the same market conditions is not 






various types of commercial risks that concerned with a variety of issues as described 
below (Checherita and Gifford 2007; Grimsey and Lewis 2002). 
Commercial Viability: Does the project make overall sense from commercial standpoint? 
Regulatory/political Support: Is there a need for more recourse or supportive policies to the 
sponsors? 
Contractual mismatch: Does the contractual structure of the project work properly? 
Environmental risks: Can the project face any adverse environmental impacts, constraints 
and hazards during the construction and operation phases? 
Input supply risks: Can raw materials and other necessary input be obtained at the projected 
costs? 
Completion risks: Can the project be completed on time and on budget? 
Force majeure risk: How can the project cope with force majeure events? 
Operating risks: Will the project be capable of operating at the expected performance levels 
and costs? 
Revenue risk: Will the project generate traffic revenues as projected? 
The revenue risk, which is stemmed from the uncertainty about future traffic 
demand, is one of the most significant risks in a BOT transportation project. The 
investors consider the revenue risk an extremely important factor when they assess the 
feasibility of a BOT project. 
Traffic Demand Uncertainty and Revenue Risk in BOT Transportation 
Projects 






income in future that has a great degree of uncertainty associated with it (Cheah and 
Garvin 2009). For the private investors, a BOT transportation project is viable only if a 
reliable, long-term traffic revenue stream can be generated during the operation phase of 
project. Therefore, for BOT transportation projects, a critical question is whether the 
traffic demand, and consequently the traffic revenues, is high enough to cover the project 
costs, service the debt, and generate the investors’ expected return on investment. 
However, the investors often face a difficult challenge in answering this question 
especially at the early stages of the project.  
Traffic demand projections are essential inputs for the appraisal of the viability of 
a BOT transportation project. The projections are typically done based on the notion that 
the extent of traffic demand depends primarily on the performance of the economy, the 
users’ response, and the competition with other means of transport (Vassallo, 2006). The 
challenge is that regardless of the efforts that are made, long-term traffic demand 
projections are subject to high levels of uncertainty.  
In a study by J.P. Morgan (1997), the predictive accuracy of traffic forecasts 
prepared for 14 constructed toll roads in the United States was evaluated. For each toll 
road, the actual early-year performance was compared against the original forecasts. 
Among all evaluated projects, only one exceeded its original revenue forecast. Three 
forecasts were found to be optimistic by up to 25%. Finally, for four of the projects 
revenue was lower than 30% of the forecasts. Another extensive work by Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2006) based on 183 transport infrastructure projects in 14 nations showed that for 50% 
of the studied road projects the difference between actual and forecasted traffic was more 






on average, actual traffic during the first 3 years of operation was overestimated by 
approximately 35% (Vassallo and Baeza 2007). Furthermore, an international survey of 
over 100 privately-financed toll roads, bridges and tunnels in 2005 projects suggest that 
traffic forecasts are characterized by large errors and considerable optimism bias. As 
Figure 2.6 shows, the study revealed that on average traffic forecasts were optimistic and 
on average 23% higher than actual traffic demand and the error that was measured 
through the standard deviation was 0.26 (Bain 2009). Finally, a series of studies by 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) have shown that a majority of toll roads (almost 90 percent of 
new toll roads in 8 states) failed to meet revenue expectations in their first full year. By 
year 3, 75 percent remained poor performers. These studies alluded to the existence of an 
“optimism bias” in traffic and revenue forecasts, with an over-estimation of early years 
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BOT highway project. 
Traffic Revenue Risk Allocation in BOT Highway Projects 
In some sense, BOT agreements can be viewed as mechanisms for sharing of the 
risks, which are traditionally borne by the public sector, between the public sector and the 
private investors (Wibowo and Mohamed 2008). Thus, BOT agreement should be 
developed based on the findings of a process which is aimed at determining which party 
or parties should bear the consequence of each specific project risk. Throughout this 
process, the ultimate goal is to create an arrangement that reduces the risk of loss and 
satisfies the stakeholders’ goals in enhancing their value (Ward and Sussman 2006). 
It is often difficult to establish ideal amount of risk that should be transferred to 
each stakeholder in the BOT agreement. Nevertheless, there are some generally accepted 
rules regarding the allocation of the risks. Based on these rules, a particular risk should be 
retained by the party that a) is best able to assess, control, and manage that risk; or b) has 
the best access to hedging instruments; or c) has the greatest ability to diversify the risk; 
or d) assumes the risk at lowest cost (Kerf et al. 1998). Therefore, the parties to the BOT 
contract should be relieved of the risks that are believed to be better managed by other 
parties.  
Unlike some other risks such as construction or regulatory risks, which are clearly 
controllable by the project participants, the traffic revenue risk cannot be fully controlled 
by any of the BOT participants. The traffic revenue risk in the BOT highways is also 
difficult to hedge due to the lack of a liquid insurance market. As a result, the proper 






designing and implementing BOT highway concession contracts (Vassallo 2006). 
Private investors are specifically interested in limiting their exposure to the 
downside traffic revenue risk. This reduces the overall project risk and allows the 
investors to enjoy the benefits of having higher leverage and lower interest rates. Private 
investors are also interested in controlling the upside traffic revenue risk. The BOT 
transportation projects are usually highly leveraged and the investors look forward to 
realizing traffic revenue that is higher than the expectations (upside risk) as it 
compensates for the possibility of losing all their capital (Brealey et al. 1996). Moreover, 
the complete transfer of the traffic revenue risk to the concessionaire may lead to 
asymmetrical behavior by the concessionaire. If ultimately the traffic is higher than 
expected, the concessionaire will reap excess profits, whereas if the traffic is lower, the 
concessionaire will incur losses, and may attempt to force a renegotiation with the 
government (Vassallo 2006). 
The negative consequences of failing to manage traffic revenue risk have 
prompted governments to identify and utilize appropriate mechanisms for mitigating the 
traffic revenue risk. In general, by utilizing these risk mitigation mechanisms, the 
governments seek two objectives: 
1. Increasing the completeness of concession contracts to reduce the potential for 
renegotiations; and  
2. Establishing more equitable rules for sharing gains or losses between the BOT 
concessionaire and the government (Vassallo and Baeza 2007). 
Concession Extension, Revenue Enhancement, Shadow Tolls and Minimum 






revenue risk in BOT highway projects.  
It should be noted that, apart from the mechanisms that are specifically defined 
for mitigating the traffic revenue risk, the government and the concessionaire may also 
negotiate other forms of guarantees such as exchange rate, debt and equity guarantees 
(Fishbein and Babbar 1996). These guarantees are designed to enhance the 
concessionaire’s ability to develop, operate and maintain the facility to the desired 
standard while maintaining the tolls at levels affordable to users. 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
A potential mechanism for mitigating the traffic revenue risk is Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee. By offering this mechanism, the government partially assumes the 
traffic revenue risk and compensates the concessionaire in cash if the actual revenue 
generated by the project falls below the guaranteed minimum level or threshold. Hence, 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee is a mechanism for sharing the “downside” traffic revenue 
risk between the concessionaire and the government during the operation phase of a 
project.  
For many BOT transportation projects, the private sector’ participation is 
conditioned upon the inclusion of a Minimum Revenue Guarantee mechanism in the 
contract. An example of such case is the Costanera Norte project in Chile in 1998 in 
which the government initially refused to offer revenue guarantees deemed necessary by 
the private investors. Consequently, no bids were submitted for the project due to the 
private investors’ concerns about the imminent failure of the project. The private sector 
investors showed interest in the project only after the Chilean government offered to 






agreement (Brandão and Saraiva 2007). 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee is the frequently chosen mechanism by government 
for mitigating traffic revenue risk in BOT transportation projects (Irwin 2007). For 
instance, Colombia (Lewis and Mody 1997), the Dominican Republic (Luis 2004), 
Malaysia (Fishbein and Babbar 1996), South Africa (Irwin 2007), Spain (Gómez-Ibáñez 
and Meyer 1993), and Chile (Gómez Lobo and Hinojosa 2000) have all offered Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee for the road concessions. The Minimum Revenue Guarantee offered 
by the Chilean government typically ensures that the concessionaire gets revenue equal to 
70 percent of the estimated present value of its costs, including the costs of investment, 
operations, and maintenance; the guaranteed revenue might be spread over 20 years, 
providing as much as 85 percent of forecast revenue in early years and less later on. So 
far, the government has attracted a great deal of investment without having to pay much 
because of these guarantees (Irwin 2007). 
Similarly, in the Republic of Korea, the government offers to guarantee 
infrastructure firms specified fractions of their projected revenue (Irwin 2007). Typically, 
the government guarantees the projected revenue only for the first 15-20 years of 
concession. Moreover, the guarantee levels decline over time. Typically, the government 
guarantees up to 90 percent of the projected revenue in the early years of concession 
period and less later on. Finally, the government typically pays nothing if revenue is less 
than 50 percent of the forecast. This approach reduces the investors’ concerns about the 
traffic revenue risk and also encourages them to perform a comprehensive evaluation of 






Traffic Revenue Cap 
In the cases where the government shares “downside” traffic revenue risk with the 
private investors by offering a Minimum Revenue Guarantee mechanism, an arrangement 
for sharing the “upside” potential between the concessionaire and the government may 
also be negotiated. This can be achieved by considering a Traffic Revenue Cap for 
splitting the surplus traffic revenue resulted from the excessive growth of the demand 
beyond the anticipated levels. The concessionaire retains 100 percent of revenues up to a 
certain Traffic Revenue Cap threshold level, and the government receives a percentage of 
any revenues above the threshold (Fishbein and Babbar 1998). For instance, in return for 
offering a Minimum Revenue Guarantee, the government in the Republic of Korea 
demands a share of surplus traffic revenue during the first fifteen years of concession. 
Combining the Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
contractual creates a “risk and revenue sharing” mechanism between the government and 
the concessionaire. 
Pricing Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
Options 
It is clear that, by offering Minimum Revenue Guarantee on BOT projects, the 
government becomes responsible for the future liabilities that these supports may cause 
(Brandão and Saraiva 2007; Fishbein and Babbar 1996). This can become very 
burdensome for the government if the risks involved are not adequately analyzed and 
quantified. The failure of the Mexican toll road concessions after the 1994 Mexican crisis 






Fishbein and Babbar 1996). Thus, the thresholds for Minimum Revenue Guarantee as 
well as Traffic Revenue Cap must be set based on appropriate valuation that establishes 
the government’s level of exposure to the traffic revenue risk. The importance of proper 
valuation of these risk and revenue sharing mechanisms (i.e., Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap) is that it allows the government to define the levels 
of guarantee that make the project economically feasible and financially attractive for the 
private sector while limiting its financial exposure and burden. Thus, pricing the 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms helps the 
government avoid overinvestment or underinvestment in the BOT transportation projects.  
Likewise, the valuation of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue 
Cap mechanism helps the private investors make better choices about investing in the 
project based on their expectation about the project costs, the extent of traffic revenue 
risk and the level of guarantees offered. Naturally, they commit to the BOT project only 
if the offered risk and revenue sharing mechanism improves the likelihood that their 
investment will be profitable. 
Current Investment Valuation Models for BOT Projects  
While the concept of using risk and revenue sharing mechanisms such as 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap for BOT projects is appealing, 
measuring the exposure of the concessionaire and the government to the traffic revenue 
risk and establishing the correct price of these mechanisms is very challenging. Currently, 
no appropriate method that can serve this purpose is available. Traditionally, methods 
such as payback, discounted payback, internal rate of return (IRR), and net present value 






Survey studies indicate payback, internal rate of return, and net present value are the most 
frequently used valuation methods by practitioners (Brigham 1975; Graham and Harvey 
2001; Jog and Srivastava 1995; Klammer and Walker 1984). Among these, NPV analysis 
is the method traditionally used for valuation of BOT transportation projects (Cheah and 
Garvin 2009; Infrastructure Partnerships Taskforce 2003). In the following section, the 
NPV method will be examined in details. 
Net Present Value Analysis 
Traditionally, a concessionaire evaluates a BOT transportation project using the 
deterministic NPV analysis approach. The first step in this approach is to outline the 
concessionaire’s cash inflows and outflows. Table 2.2 shows an example of the 
concessionaire’s cash flows over the investment lifetime of a BOT project. The 
concessionaire’s cash outflows consist of different project cost components including 
construction costs, operations, maintenance, and rehabilitation costs, and debt payment 
plan. Construction costs are the initial expenses to build a BOT project. Operations, 
maintenance, and capital improvement costs are annual expenses required to keep the 
highway project within the acceptable service level. The debt payment plan summarizes 
the principal and interest payments of construction-related loans or other costs related to 
financing such as public bonds. The annual concessionaire’s cash inflows start after the 
project is completed and the project opens for traffic. The projected concessionaire’s 
operating revenue is primarily based on the tolls collected from the traffic. The toll rates 
for various kinds of vehicles are predetermined in the initial concession agreement and 






computed as the net difference between the annual cash inflows and outflows over the 
project lifetime. These project net cash flows are also shown in Table 2.2. 
Table  2.2 An example of the concessionaire's cash flow table over the investment lifetime 
of a BOT project 
  
 
These net cash flows are discounted back to the beginning of the project to 
calculate the concessionaire’s NPV. The choice of discount rate in the NPV analysis 
approach is often subjective and, therefore, challenging in the BOT project valuation. The 
discount rate represents the rate of return that the concessionaire expects from investing 
in the BOT project, i.e., the discount rate is the risk-adjusted cost of capital for the 
concessionaire. The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) are two methods, which have been frequently used in the 
identification of the discount rate for BOT projects. Using the concessionaire’s choice of 
discount rate and the BOT project net cash flows, the NPV analysis can be conducted 
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Year  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 …. 2030 
Financing Activities Inflows 34.9 209.7 385.4 351.7 240.1 …. 
Equity 34.9 209.7 131.9 …. 
Debt 253.6 351.7 240.1 …. 
Financing Activities Outflows 
Construction Cost -34.9 -209.7 -385.4 -351.7 -240.1 …. 
Operations Revenue …. 882.5 
Operations & Maintenance …. -373.7 






Where n is the length of construction period in years; N is the total concession length in 
years from the initial construction to the return of the highway asset to the government; 
CCi  i = 1, 2, …, n are the annual construction costs from the beginning of the project 
until the end of construction period; OCj  j = n+1, n+2, …, N are the annual operations, 
maintenance, and rehabilitation costs from the first year after the project is completed 
until the end of concession period; PRj  j = n+1, n+2, …, N are the forecasted annual 
traffic revenues from the first year after the project is completed until the end of 
concession period; and ρ is the discount rate.  
Limitations of the NPV Analysis Approach  
The advantage of NPV analysis approach is that it provides clear and consistent 
decision criteria that applicable to all projects. These decision criteria are relatively 
simple, widely taught and generally accepted. Moreover, the results of the NPV analysis 
are not influenced by the risk preferences of the investors. Finally, the NPV analysis 
results are easy to understand and interpret. A positive NPV means that the project is 
financially viable (Vandoros and Pantouvakis 2006). However, the NPV method is 
subject to major limitations when it comes to the proper evaluation of BOT projects.  
The future traffic demand for BOT transportation projects, which drive the 
concessionaire’s revenue cash inflows, is subject to considerable uncertainty. This is due 
to the inability of current traffic models to accurately determine the behavior traffic 
demand over the concession period (TRANSYT 2007). As a result, there is an adverse 
possibility that the project cash flows may not be sufficient to cover the project costs, 
service the debt, and generate the investors’ expected return on investment. The NPV 
analysis approach does not have the capability to capture and treat the uncertainty about 






conventional NPV analysis to describe how the discount rate should be adjusted to reflect 
the uncertainty about future traffic demand and the traffic revenue risk. The choice of an 
exogenous discount rate is critical for the proper evaluation of BOT projects since the 
project NPV is very sensitive to changes in the value of discount rate.  
The NPV analysis approach is also unable to address the impact of Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap on the financial value of investments in 
BOT transportation projects. Moreover, the NPV analysis approach is unable to 
determine the correct market value of these risk and revenue sharing mechanisms and 
cannot be used for establishing the appropriate Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap threshold. The poor choice of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap can lead to the inappropriate risk-sharing between the government and the 
private investors and impact the financial solvency of project. This can eventually result 
in the default by the concessionaire or the failure of a BOT project. These failures can 
have significant implications for the public and private investors. Specifically, default by 
a private partner can create huge unexpected costs for the government and reduce its 
flexibility to invest in other required infrastructure projects.  
Real Options 
The described limitations of the NPV analysis approach BOT projects can be 
overcome by using a different approach for evaluating investments under uncertainty that 
is called Real Options. The Real Options Analysis is an emerging state-of-the-art 
financial engineering methodology that provides an integrated formwork to evaluate 







Based on the options theory an option is defined as the right, without an 
associated symmetric obligation, to buy (or sell) a specified asset under specified terms. 
Usually there a specified price and a specified period of time over which the option is 
valid (Luenberger 1998). By providing the opportunity to exercise the option only if it is 
in the option’s holder benefit to do so, an option creates a beneficial asymmetry that is 
essential to its value (Trigeorgis 1996). The option theory studies how to model and price 
the opportunity created by an option, which is often present either in form of a 
contractual right or an embedded flexibility. If the option can be exercised before 
maturity, it is called an American option; if only at maturity, a European option. 
Options Theory 
An area of work that concentrates on the theoretical valuation of an option is 
called option pricing theory. Financial option theory was first developed by the French 
mathematician Louis Bachelier in 1900 and became a mature science in the 1970’s 
thanks to the seminal Nobel Prize winning research by Merton, Black, and Scholes 
(Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973). There are several approaches the valuation of 
options that are based on different assumptions about the market, the dynamics of 
underlying asset (e.g., stock) behavior and individual preference (Luenberger 1998; 
Trigeorgis 1996). However, the common valuation concept of option pricing theory is 
that an option can be priced based on the construction of a portfolio of a specific number 
of shares of an underlying asset, and that one can borrow against the shares at a risk-free 






2001; Trigeorgis 1996). A brief introduction to the option pricing theory and valuation of 
options is presented below. This introduction, which is developed based on Luenberger 
(Luenberger 1998; Trigeorgis 1996), focuses on the development of the option pricing 
theory for a single-period option. A single step of a binomial process is going to be for 
this purpose. The discussion about multi-period valuation process will be presented later.  
Suppose that the initial price of a stock is S . At the end of the period, the price 
will either be uS with probability P or dS with probability1 p . It is assumed that
0u d  . Also, it is possible to borrow and lend at a common risk-free interest rate r .  
Let  1R r  ; to avoid arbitrage opportunities, the condition u R d  must always 
hold (Luenberger 1998). Now suppose also that there is a call option on the stock with 
the exercise price X that expires at the end of the period. The no-arbitrage argument can 
be used to find the value of this option. 
In Figure 2.9, the binomial lattices for the stock price, the value of the risk-free 








Figure  2.7 Binomial lattices for stock price, value of the risk-free asset and value of 
option 
 
All three of the lattices above all move together along the same path. For instance, 
if the stock price moves along the upward path, the risk-free asset and the call option both 
move along the upward path of their lattices as well. The value of risk-free asset is 
deterministic (i.e., the return at the end of period will always be R ), however, the risk-
free asset is treated as if it were a derivative of the stock by making the value at the end 
of each arc the same. If the stock price S is known, all other values of these lattices are 
known except the value of the call optionC . The patterns corresponding to the outcomes 
of option can be constructed by combining various proportions of the stock price and 
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 (2.2) 
 
To duplicate the two outcomes shown above, y dollars’ worth of stock and b
C
max(uS - X, 0) 












dollars’ worth of the risk-free asset must be purchased. This portfolio that duplicates the 
outcome of the option is often referred to as a replicating portfolio. At the end of period, 
depending on the patch that stock is taken, this replicating portfolio will be worth either 
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The no-arbitrage argument can be used to establish that value y b is the value of 
the call option C since the constructed replicating portfolio produces exactly the same 






price of the call, the call option will never be purchased. Indeed, arbitrage profits by 
buying this portfolio and selling the call for an immediate gain and no further 
consequences. If the prices are unequal in the reverse, the same argument can be done in 
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There is a simplified way to view the above equation. The quantity q  can be 
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From the relation u R d   that was assumed to hold earlier, it can be 
concluded that 0 1q  . Therefore, q  can be considered to be a probability. Equation 
(2.6) now can be re-written as 
 
   1 1u dC qC q CR                        (2.8) 
 
Equation (2.8) implies that the value of optionC can be found by taking the 
expected value of the option using the probability q , and then discounting this value 






probability that would prevail in a risk-neutral world where investors are indifferent to 
risk and can be used for valuation of all securities.  
An important feature of the pricing Equation (2.6) is that it is independent of the 
probability p of an upward movement in the lattice. This is because no trade-off among 
the probabilistic events is made. The value is found by perfectly matching the outcomes 
of the option with a combination of stock and the risk-free asset. Probability never enters 
the matching calculation.  
The solution method discussed above can be extended to multi-period options by 
working backward one step at a time. 
A two-stage lattice representing a two period call option is shown in Figure 2.8. 
As in the case for single-period option, it is assumed that the initial price of the stock is S . 
This price is going to change by the up and down factorsu and d while moving through 
the lattice.  
 
 
Figure  2.8 Two-stage lattice representing a two period call option 
 
The values shown in the lattice belong to the corresponding call option that has 
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R is the one-period return on the risk-free asset. Assuming that the option is not exercised 
early, the values of uC and dC can be calculated using the single-period equation 
presented above. Specifically,  
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By applying the risk-neutral discounting formula, C can be calculated as  
 
    1 1u u dC qC q CR                          (2.11) 
 
The same procedure can be used for lattices with more periods. Starting from the last 
period and working backward toward the initial time, the single-period risk-free 






Black and Scholes Formula 
When expanded the option valuation approach presented above can appropriately 
solve most option problems. There is however, a continuous version of the theory and 
extension of the lattice theory that leads to new financial insights, allows the 
consideration of more complex derivative securities, provide alternative computation 
methods, and prepare the way for more complete theory of investment (Luenberger 1998).  
In the continuous view, the stock prices or project gross values are assumed to 
follow a stochastic process thus their values change over time in an uncertain manner. A 
particular type of stochastic process is the Markov process, where only the present state 
of the process (i.e., the asset value) is relevant for the prediction of the future while the 
past history is irrelevant. A particular type of the Markov process is the Weiner process 
or Brownian motion. If a variable ( )z t follows a Weiner process, then changes in z ( z ) 
over small time intervals ( t ) must satisfy two essential properties: 
1. z  over small and non-overlapping time intervals are independent. That is, the 
process can be thought of as the continuous limit of a discrete random walk; and 
2. z  are normally distributed, with mean ( ) 0E z  and a variance that increase 
linearly with the time interval. In other words, ( )Var z t   and tz t    , where 
t is a normally distributed random variable with zero mean and standard deviation of 
1. In continuous time as 0t  , the increment of a standard Weiner process becomes
tdz dt  , with ( ) 0E dz  and ( )Var dz dt . 
Nevertheless, prices changes are not normally distributed. In fact, they are closer 






natural logarithm of stock prices follows a Weiner process. Evidence also suggests that 
the stocks have non-zero drift and volatility that is not necessarily equal to 1. Therefore, a 
more generalized Weiner process is often used to present the asset dynamics. It is 
generally written as  
 
( , ) ( , )ds S t S t dz                          (2.12) 
 
Where dz is the increment of a standard Weiner process with mean 0 and variance
dt , ( , )S t and ( , )S t are the drift and variance coefficient expressed as the functions of 
current state and time. The continuous-time stochastic process is called and Ito Process 
with mean ( ) ( , )E dS S t dt and variance 2( ) ( , )Var dS S t dt . 
In the seminal paper, Black and Scholes (1973) showed that the continuous 
application of a dynamic portfolio replication strategy under certain assumptions results 
in a fundamental partial differential equation that must be satisfied by the value of the 
European call option (Trigeorgis 1996). Therefore, the logic behind the Black-Scholes 
approach is conceptually identical to what was used for the binomial lattice. It implies 
that at each given moment, to assets can be combined to construct a portfolio that 
replicates the behavior of the option (Trigeorgis 1996).  
Let’s assume that the asset price dynamics is described by a special case of 
generalized Weiner process which is called the Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) with 
drift, or the standard diffusion Weiner process where ( , )S t S   and 2 2 2( , )S t S  . 







dS Sdt Sdz                          (2.13) 
Where z is standard Brownian motion or a Wiener process. Suppose that there is a 
risk-free asset (e.g., a bond) carrying an interest rate of r over 0,T . Thus, the value B
of this bond satisfies 
 
dB rBdt                          (2.14) 
 
Consider a security that is derivative to S , which means that its price is a function 
of S and t . Let  ,f S t denote the price of this security at time t when that stock price is
S . The derivative of this security has a price  ,f S t , which satisfies the partial 
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                 (2.15) 
 
Although it is usually impossible to find an analytical solution to the Black-
Scholes equation, it is possible to find such solution for a European call option. This 
analytical solution has great practical and theoretical use. 
Consider a European call option with strike price X and expiration timeT . If the 
underlying stock pays no dividends during the time  0,T and if interest is constant and 
continuously compounded at rate r , the Black-Scholes solution is    , ,f S t C S t , 
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And where  N x denotes the standard cumulative normal probability distribution, 
C denotes the current value of the European call option, S denotes the current price of 
underlying stock, and r is the risk-free interest rate 
Real Options Concept 
Options can be associated with investment opportunities that are not financial 
instruments. For instance, if one acquires a piece of land, one has the option to drill for 
oil, and then later the option of extracting oil if it is found. Such options are often termed 
as real options to emphasize that they involve real activities or real commodities as 
opposed to purely financial commodities such as stock options (Luenberger 1998). 
The term “Real Options” was first introduced by Myers (1977) as reference to the 
application of options pricing theory and methods from finance to the assessment of non-
financial or “Real” investment opportunities. Since then, the field of real options analysis 
has gone through a transition from a topic of a modest academic interest in 1980s and 90s 






2005). Many researchers have contributed to the expansion of real option theory (Amram 
and Kulatilaka 1999; Copeland and Antikarov 2003; Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Trigeorgis 
1996). de Neufville made a major contribution by categorizing real options based on their 
nature into real options “on” and “in” projects. In de Neufville’s view, real options “on” 
projects are mostly concerned with the valuation of investment opportunities, while real 
options “in” projects are mostly concerned with design of flexibility (Wang and Neufville 
2005).   
In the mid-1990s, real options began to attract attention from industry as a 
potentially important tool for investment valuation and strategy. In the application 
context, real options approach was primarily applied to decision-making elated to 
corporate investment projects and corporate valuation as the state-of-the-art financial 
engineering methodology that provides an integrated formwork to evaluate investment 
opportunities under dynamic market uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). It also allows 
companies to examine programs of capital expenditures as multi-year investments, rather 
than as individual projects (Copeland and Antikarov 2003). This is crucial since strategic 
decisions are rarely one-time events, particularly in investment-intensive industries.  
Leslie and Michaels (1997) argue that NPV analysis is inferior to the real options analysis 
since it recognizes only two of crucial factors that the real option valuation approach 
captures: the present value of expected future cash flows and the present value of fixed 
costs. Therefore, NPV can mislead whenever there is uncertainty and flexibility to 
respond to uncertainty over the rate of cash flow growth, because it incorporate only two 
key levers of value criteria. Figure 2.9 presents a comparison between a traditional NPV 
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 Ford et al. (2002) present a real options approach in order to proactively utilize 
strategic flexibility and capture project values hidden in dynamic uncertainties and 
apply it to evaluate and select strategies for a toll road project proposal. 
 Ho and Liu (2002) present an option pricing model for evaluating the impact of the 
government’s guarantee and the developer’s negotiation option on the financial 
viability of privatized infrastructure projects.  
 Zhao and Tseng (2003) present an option pricing model for assessing design 
flexibility in infrastructure projects. The proposed real option model is applied to 
assess the expansion option of a public parking garage. 
 Zhao et al. (2004) develop a multi-stage stochastic model for decision-making in 
highway development, operations, and rehabilitation, which considers three sources 
of uncertainty, namely, future traffic demand, land price, and highway deterioration, 
as well as their interdependencies.  
 Garvin and Cheah (2004) propose the use of option pricing model in order to enhance 
traditional project evaluation and capture the strategic value hidden in flexibility to 
defer infrastructure projects. They apply the proposed valuation method to assess the 
deferment option value of the Dulles Greenway project.  
 de Neufville et al. (2006) present a spreadsheet model for valuing flexibility in 
engineering systems. The proposed approach is employed to assess the expansion 
options for a multistory parking garage. 
 Cheah and Liu (2006) use Monte Carlo simulation methodology to evaluate 
government guarantees and subsidies as real options and apply it to the case of the 






 Huang and Chou (2006) develop a compound option pricing formula for the Taiwan 
High-Speed Rail Project. Guarantee options combined with the option to abandon in 
the pre-construction phase are evaluated as a series of European style call options in 
their work.  
 Chiara et al. (2007) model governmental guarantees on BOT projects as one of three 
discrete-exercise real options: European, Bermudan, and simple multiple-exercise 
(Australian) options, and expand the least-squares Monte Carlo technique to value 
these guarantees.  
 Brandão and Saraiva (2008) present a real options model for evaluating highway 
projects with minimum traffic guarantees, and apply it to the 1000 mile BR-163 toll 
road project that links the Brazilian Midwest to the Amazon River. 
Gaps in Knowledge 
After analyzing the literature on the application of real options in transportation 
infrastructure systems management, it was concluded that the existing models are subject 
to significant limitations. These limitations are discussed below. 
Estimation of the Project Volatility for Real Options Analysis 
Uncertainty is the key driver of the value of options. One of the most critical 
inputs to options valuation models is the volatility. Volatility measures the uncertainty 
about investment value over time. Financial options derive their price from the value of 
their underlying financial assets, such as stocks. Therefore, option volatility can be 






the implied volatility from the Black-Scholes model based on the current market price of 
an option. Estimating the volatility of a real option in transportation infrastructure 
projects is much more difficult since these projects are unique and there is no relevant 
data on historical or current market prices of the transportation projects that can be used 
as the basis for volatility estimation. The current literature on the application of real 
options in transportation infrastructure management does not provide a systematic 
method for estimating the project volatility. In the existing real option models, the project 
volatility values that are used as inputs to the model are assumed values. Therefore, the 
application of the current real options models to the valuation of investments in BOT 
projects under the uncertainty about future traffic demand can lead to an erroneous 
valuation. There is a pressing need for a method that can systematically estimate the 
project volatility for pricing real options such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee and 
Traffic Revenue Cap in BOT transportation projects. 
Finding the Market Value of Real Options in Transportation Project 
In order to determine the price of an option, the benefits resulted from exercising 
the option should be discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. The risk-adjusted 
discount rates for options vary widely depending on a several factors including the 
volatility of project due to various market and project risks. When it comes to the 
valuation of real options in transportation projects, it is typically impossible to estimate 
the correct and exact risk-adjusted discount rate that reflects the market risks, project 
risks that are unique to these projects and asymmetric benefit patterns of options 
(Brigham and Ehrhardt 2011; Ford et al. 2002). The existing literature on the application 






and often suggest the utilization of approximate discount rates for real options valuation. 
Therefore, the application of the current real options models to the valuation BOT 
investments under traffic demand uncertainty does not lead to the determination of 
correct market value of real options. There is a need for an appropriate method that can 
overcome this challenge and determine the market value of options such as Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap in BOT projects. 
Characterizing the Concessionaire’s Risk Profile under Traffic Demand 
Uncertainty 
Current real options models also do not address several critical questions when it 
comes to the valuation of investments BOT project under traffic demand uncertainty. 
Existing models do not determine the concessionaire’s financial risk profile under 
uncertainty about future traffic demand in a BOT project. These real options models 
cannot characterize the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
options on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile. Also, existing real options models 
do not determine the likelihood of Minimum Revenue Guarantee payment to the 
concessionaire as well as the likelihood of Traffic Revenue Cap payments to the 
government. An appropriate real options valuation model is required to enhance the 
current understanding of the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap mechanisms on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile.  
Research Objectives 






to explicitly price Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap under the 
uncertainty about future traffic demand. The specific research objectives that will be 
addressed in this research are:  
1. Model the long-term traffic demand uncertainty in BOT projects;  
2. Devise an appropriate method for estimating the project volatility for real options 
analysis; 
3. Devise an appropriate method for finding the market value of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options in BOT projects; and 
4. Create a procedure for characterizing the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and 
Traffic Revenue Cap options on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile. 
The proposed real options model, which is created in order meet the above 
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Guarantees (Minimum Revenue Guarantee) is the frequently used mechanism for 
mitigating the traffic revenue risk in BOT transportation projects. In general a minimum 
revenue guarantee is a contract based on which the government partially assumes the 
traffic revenue risk and compensates the concessionaire in cash if the traffic revenue falls 
below a specified minimum level or threshold. Hence, Minimum Revenue Guarantee is a 
mechanism for sharing the “downside” revenue risk between the concessionaire and 
government in the operation phase.  
In many cases where the government shares “downside” risk with the private 
investors by offering Minimum Revenue Guarantee, an arrangement for sharing the 
“upside” potential between the concessionaires and the government may also be 
negotiated. This approach can be achieved by considering a mechanism for splitting the 
surplus revenue resulted from the excessive growth of the demand beyond the anticipated 
revenue levels. This mechanism is called Traffic Revenue Cap (TRC). The 
concessionaire retains 100 percent of revenues up to the Traffic Revenue Cap threshold 
level, and the government receives a pre-determined percentage of any revenues above 
the threshold. The combination of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue 
Cap creates a risk and revenue sharing mechanism between the government and the 
concessionaire involved in a BOT transportation project. 
It is critical for the project stakeholder to measure their exposure to the traffic 
revenue risks in the presence of these risk and revenue sharing mechanism and determine 
the market value of such mechanisms. It helps the private investors make better choices 
about investing in a BOT project based on their expectation about the project costs, the 






Cap and Minimum Revenue Guarantee mechanism also helps the government avoid 
overinvestment or underinvestment in the BOT transportation projects. In this research, 
the real options theory is used to create the investment valuation model that characterizes 
the long-term traffic demand uncertainty in BOT projects and determines investors’ 
financial risk profile under this uncertainty. This model presents a novel method for 
estimating the project volatility for real options analysis. This model also devises a 
market-based option pricing approach to determine the value of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. An appropriate procedure is created for 
characterizing the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
options on the investors’ financial risk profile. 
Figure 3.1 shows an overview of the proposed real options model consisting of 
the following major steps: 
1. Establish input data requirements, e.g., cost data related to the BOT project, the 
concessionaire’s capital structure, and future traffic demand; 
2. Model uncertainty about long-term traffic demand 
a. Develop a binomial lattice model to characterize uncertainty about future 
traffic demand; 
b. Generate random future paths for future traffic demand using Monte Carlo 
simulation technique;  
3. Conduct life cycle cost and revenue analysis for the BOT project under each random 
traffic path and characterize the concessionaire’s financial risk profile for the case 
that Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap are not offered; and 
4. Price the Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options 






b. Adjust the binomial lattice model of future traffic demand based on the risk-
neutral option valuation approach  
c. Repeat steps (2) and (3) and adjust the annual revenues based on the 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options pay-offs. 
Calculate the market value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap, and characterize the concessionaire’s financial risk profile with 







































Establish Information Requirements 
The proposed model requires certain data as inputs. The first dataset is concerned 
with the BOT project life cycle costs that include several components. The construction 
cost is the first item contributing to the project lifecycle. It includes the costs of 
constructing the physical asset based on the specified standards as well as the cost of 
survey, design, right of way acquisition, management fee, interest, tax, and any other 
necessary cost item.  
In a BOT transportation projects, the concessionaire has the responsibility to 
operate the facility during the concession period and maintain a certain performance and 
service quality level. These performance and service quality level requirements are 
generally set by the government considering the “user costs”. User costs are delay, 
vehicle operating, and crash costs incurred by the users of a facility. User costs are 
heavily influenced by current and future roadway operating characteristics (Walls and 
Smith 1998). Therefore, governments typically regulate the level of service quality that 
the facility provides to the public by incorporating satisfaction metrics into the contract. 
These measures require the private partner to improve the service quality and maintain 
the asset according to the specified standards by conducting regular maintenance, 
frequent rehabilitations, and emergency maintenance projects (Alexandersson and Hultén 
2010; Shaoul 2009). The O&M costs capture the costs associated with these activities. It 
also includes tax, enforcement costs and other overhead costs associated to operation of 
the infrastructure.  
The second dataset is concerned with the concessionaire’s capital structure. It 






equity and debt. Another component of this dataset is the debt payment plan and the 
concessionaire’s cost of capital. The debt payment plan includes a series of principal and 
interest payments to the lenders over a certain period of time, which is commonly known 
as debt services. Debt services, which take the next priority after O&M costs, should be 
paid from the project revenues. This dataset also includes the payments to equity 
providers. Another component of this dataset is the cost of capital that is the minimum 
rate of return that the concessionaire needs to compensate for bearing risks and waiting 
for returns. This rate is specific to the concessionaire and will be used as the discount rate 
in project valuation. 
The third dataset is concerned with the cash inflow resulted from the operation of 
the BOT project during the concession period. In most BOT highway projects, the major 
source of revenue is the toll collected from the road users. Projections of this operating 
revenue are generally provided in traffic and revenue studies which are typically 
conducted by special consultant groups. A typical traffic and revenue study provides the 
Annual Average Daily Traffic (AADT) values over the concession lifetime. AADT is the 
total volume of vehicles passing through a highway in a year divided by 365 days. From 
a modeling point of view, BOT projects have two primary characteristics. First, little or 
no historical data is available on the future traffic demand. Second, the concession period 
for these projects is predetermined, and it typically ranges from 10 to 40 years. The 
transport models that are generally used in traffic and revenue studies, predict the AADT 
for a single scenario or a limited number of scenarios (e.g., low and high growth, etc.). 
Therefore, their predictions are mostly point estimates, and, even when produced for 






the future traffic demand.  
The model created in this research treats the uncertainty about future traffic 
demand in a stochastic manner. It uses the projections provided by the traffic study report 
in order to determine the projected initial traffic demand for the BOT project. The traffic 
study report is also used to determine the expected annual growth rate of AADT. This 
expected annual growth rate may change over the project lifetime depending on the 
traffic study assumptions. Suppose AADTj  j = n+1, n+2, …, N are the most-likely 
forecasts of AADT from the first year after the project is completed (n+1) until the end of 
concession lifetime (N). These N-n data points in time, spanning over N-(n+1) periods, 
are going to be used in order to compute the expected annual growth rate of AADT – 
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     (3.1) 
 
The expected annual growth rate of AADT is not sufficient to characterize the 
uncertainty about future traffic demand. In order to describe the uncertainty about future 
traffic demand the annual volatility of AADT is also required. Annual volatility or 
parameter σ hereafter refers to the standard deviation of the expected annual growth rate 
of AADT. It provides a valuable measure for understanding and quantifying the risk of 
underestimating/overestimating the future traffic growth over the concession lifetime. 
The choice of annual volatility of AADT is often not easy since the BOT project is yet to 






1. Use historical AADT data of similar existing highway projects to estimate the 
volatility of the new BOT project (Irwin 2003);  
2. Use the forecasted annual volatility of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the region 
where the BOT project is built as a surrogate measure for the annual volatility of 
AADT (Banister 2005); and  
3. Refer to the subject matter experts’ opinions to estimate the annual volatility of the 
AADT of a new BOT project (Brandão and Saraiva 2008).  
The concessionaire can use one or a combination of the above approaches to 
provide an appropriate estimate for σ of AADT. Sensitivity analysis should, however, be 
conducted to account for the risk of improper estimation for the volatility of AADT.  
 
Model Uncertainty about Long-term Traffic Demand  
The uncertain nature of traffic demand implies that an appropriate stochastic 
model should be conceived in order to determine how the traffic demand evolves over 
time. There are four basic stochastic processes: Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), 
mean-reversion process, barrier long-run process, and jump-diffusion process (Mun 
2006). Many recent engineering economic analyses have relied on an implicit or explicit 
assumption that value of an underlying asset (e.g., stock) that changes over time with 
uncertainty follows a GBM process (Marathe and Ryan 2005). The GBM model has also 
been used to represent future demand in capacity studies. For instance, Whitt (1981) 
studies capacity utilization over time assuming demand followed a GBM. This 
assumption is indirectly validated by Lieberman (1989) who, through an empirical study 






Ryan (2004) assumes demand for services in rapidly growing industries follows a GBM. 
In all cases, the demand is assumed to follow aGBM process given by 
 
dS Sdt Sdz                            (3.2) 
 
Where is the constant drift rate, the constant variance rate, and dz the 
increment of a standard Weiner process, i.e., tdz t where t is (0,1)N and for t s ,
( ) 0t sE    . A discrete approximation to this underlying stochastic process can be 
developed to provide a transparent and computationally efficient model for valuation 
problems (Brandão et al. 2005).  
The most recognized example of this approach is the binomial lattice model. A 
binomial lattice may be viewed as a probability tree with binary chance branches, with 
the unique feature that the outcome resulting from moving up and then down in value is 
the same as the outcome from moving down and then up. Thus, binomial lattice is 
recombining with numerous paths resulting in the same outcomes. The main advantage of 
using this method is that from each time step to the next, the number of possible 
outcomes increases linearly (at time 0 there is one possibility, at time 1 two possibilities, 
and so on). This linear increase from each period to the next allows for a wide array of 
possibilities to be handled in convenient fashion (Chambers 2007). Another characteristic 
of binomial lattice is that the values projected on the lattice follow a lognormal 
distribution, with only non-negative values shown. The binomial lattice model was 
originally developed by Cox et al. (1979) as a mathematically intuitive tool to accurately 







In this research, the binomial lattice model is used to characterize uncertainty 
about future values of AADT. The binomial lattice is powerful yet flexible model for 
representation of uncertainty about AADT. In economics and finance, the binomial lattice 
is an appropriate random walk model to capture uncertainty about a variable that grows 
over time plus random noise (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Copeland and Antikarov 2001). 
The modeling choice of binomial lattice is consistent with the general body of knowledge 
in real options analysis (Hull 2008; Luenberger 1998). It has been used by several 
researchers such as Garvin and Cheah (2004), and Ho and Liu (2002) to characterize 
uncertainty about future traffic demand.  
A basic period length of one month is considered to define a binomial lattice for 
future traffic demand, i.e., ∆t = 1 month = 1⁄12 year. According to the model formulation, 
the current traffic demand 0AADT is known. In this model, it is assumed that 0AADT  is 
chosen randomly from a triangular distribution for which the lowest, most likely and 
highest values are the pessimistic, most likely, and optimistic forecasts of the initial 
traffic demand, respectively. These forecasts are typically specified in the traffic and 
revenue study report.  
The AADT at the beginning of each period is assumed to take just one of the two 
multiples of the AADT at the previous period: a multiple u for the upward movement and 
a multiple d for the downward movement where both u and d are positive values with 
u>1 and d<1. The probabilities of upward and downward movements are 0≤p≤ 1 and 
0≤1-p≤1, respectively. These binomial lattice parameters can be determined using the 






formulated in Equation 3.3 (Hull 2008): 
 




















    (3.3) 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the binomial lattice for future values of AADT. The initial 
AADT is 0AADT . It is the expected AADT at the beginning of the first year after the 
project is completed. The AADT at the beginning of the second month will be either 
0u AADT with probability p or 0d AADT with probability 1-p. This variation pattern 
continues for subsequent months until the end of the concession lifetime. The probability 
of upward movement from any node in this lattice is p and the probability of downward 
movement from any node is 1-p. The recombining feature of this binomial lattice implies 
that an upward movement followed by a downward movement is identical to a downward 








Figure  3.2 A binomial lattice to model uncertainty about future traffic demand 
 
A slight modification in this binomial lattice model is necessary to ensure that 
infeasible, large future traffic demand is not generated for AADT. A highway is 
operationally adequate for providing satisfactory services to a specific maximum number 
of vehicles (Transportation Research Board 2000). This maximum capacity can be used 
as the cap for AADT values in this binomial lattice. Thus, in this binomial lattice model, 
the AADT values over this cap will be changed to the maximum AADT. 
This lattice model is a flexible and powerful tool for capturing the dynamic 
uncertainty about future traffic demand in an approximate fashion. Particularly, if the 
period length is relatively small (e.g., 1 month), many AADT values are possible after 
several short time steps (Hull 2008; Luenberger 1998). This AADT binomial lattice will 
be used as a basis to generate random paths for future traffic demand in the BOT project 























Generate Random Traffic Demand Paths 
Monte Carlo simulation technique can be used to generate several random paths 
for future traffic demand along the binomial lattice from the first year after the project is 
completed until the end of the concession lifetime. The Monte Carlo simulation method is 
essentially a method for evaluating an integral  
 
      U X U x x dx                        (3.4) 
 
where   is the expectation with respect to the probability density   and 
 U is some response function, e.g., a utility function. It involves generating random 
draws ( )jX x from the target distribution and then estimating by 
 
 (1) ( )1ˆ ( ( kU x U x
k
                         (3.5) 
 
Monte Carlo method is a numeric approach for evaluating the above integral. In 
addition, if the random draws  jx are independent, an estimate of the error of the 
approximation using the Central Limit Theorem can be easily obtained (Fishmann 1996). 
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to value complex real options whose payoffs 
are dependent on a project’s cash flows. This technique uses repeated random sampling 
from the probability distributions for each of the crucial primary variables underlying the 






In Chapter 2, it was shown that the binomial method is consistent with the Black-
Scholes-Merton framework. Therefore, the binomial lattice can be considered as the 
combination of all possible paths for the underlying asset movements. On the other hand, 
the standard Monte Carlo method has the capability to simulate all the possible 
movements of the underlying asset. Therefore, for the purpose of valuation under 
uncertainty, it is possible to generate sample paths through the binomial lattice instead of 
implementing the generic Monte Carlo method that randomly samples from the 
continuous stochastic process for the traffic demand. This is the idea behind the method 
that has been used in this study in order to model evolving traffic demand uncertainty and 
generate random paths of future traffic demand. These random paths will be used for 
pricing the Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. 
Considering the binomial lattice formulation, AADT at the beginning of the (j)th 
year j = n+1, n+2, …, N is a random variable that follows a discrete binomial distribution. 
There are several upward and downward movements that are needed to reach any node in 
this lattice from the root. The initial AADT at the beginning of the (n+1)th year is
0AADT , which represents the respective AADT value of the root node in the binomial 
lattice model. The possible values of AADT at the beginning of the (n+2)th year, (n+3)th 
year, …, (N)th year are summarized in the binomial lattice nodes of the 12th month, 24th 
month, …, (12×(N-(n+1)))th month, respectively. 
Take any node in month l = 12, 24, …, 12×(N-(n+1)). This node can be reached 
from the root node by 0≤k≤l upside and 0≤l-k≤l downside movements along the lattice. 
The AADT at this node, then, becomes 0
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Conduct Lifecycle Cost and Revenue Analysis under Traffic Demand 
Uncertainty without Real Options 
Each generated random AADT path can be used to create another path that 
represents a possible traffic revenue stream for the concessionaire. The annual operating 
revenue from the first year after the project is completed until the end of concession 
lifetime, i.e., ORj j = n+1, n+2,…, N can be calculated for each generated random AADT 
path as follows: 
 
365     1, 2,....,j j jOR AADT Scheduled Toll Rate j n n N         (3.7)  
 
Thus, through each simulation run, random paths of the concessionaire’s future 
revenues from the operation of the BOT project are generated. These randomly generated 
revenue streams will then be used to calculate the concessionaire’s NPV based on the 
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Where n is the length of construction period in years; N is the overall concession 
length in years from the initial construction to the return of the highway asset to the 
government; CCi i = 1, 2, …, n are the annual construction costs from the beginning of 
the project until the end of construction period; OCj j = n+1, n+2, …, N are the annual 






completed until the end of concession period; ORj j = n+1, n+2, …, N are the randomly 
generated traffic revenues from the first year after the project is completed until the end 
of concession period; and is the discount rate. The concessionaire’s cost of capital is 
used as the discount rate ( ) in this equation.  
A sufficiently large number of simulation runs should be conducted to calculate 
all possible NPVs, in addition to their respective likelihoods. Using the simulation results, 
the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) can be identified for the concessionaire’s 
NPV. Therefore, the proposed model expands the conventional NPV analysis approach 
by the systematic treatment of uncertainty about future traffic demand. 
The CDF of the concessionaire’s NPV can be used to calculate the probability of 
the event that the NPV of investing in the BOT project is negative. Investors can use this 
probability and decide whether investing in the BOT concession stays within the 
appropriate confidence level in their portfolio. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis can be 
conducted to evaluate the effect of traffic demand volatility on the distribution of the 
concessionaire’s NPV. The sensitivity analysis starts from that analysis of a reference 
scenario, where usually the most likely estimate of the traffic demand volatility will be 
utilized to develop the reference NPV distribution. Then, while keeping all other 
variables equal to their value in the reference case, traffic demand volatility will be 
modified around the reference value. The results of this analysis provide an insight into 
how the distribution of NPV changes in response to the variations of traffic demand 
volatility. 
Price Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap Options 






government support instruments such as Minimum Revenue Guarantee, which transfer a 
portion of the revenue risk to the government.  
Minimum Revenue Guarantee is a contract that allows the concessionaire to 
redeem the revenue shortfalls up to a certain level at discrete points over the operation 
phase of the BOT project. Thus, Minimum Revenue Guarantee can be modeled as a 
discrete-exercise option, which can be exercised at discrete points over a pre-determined 
time period. As the Minimum Revenue Guarantee holder, the concessionaire has the right 
but not the obligation to exercise this option and receive payments from the government 
at specific points of time over the concession lifetime. The additional revenue is the 
concessionaire’s option pay-off that changes the concessionaire’s financial risk profile in 
the BOT project and makes up the value of Minimum Revenue option.  
Similarly, Traffic Revenue Cap is a revenue-sharing mechanism through which 
the concessionaire shares a percentage of the excess traffic revenue with the government 
if the traffic revenue exceeds the pre-specified ceiling level. Traffic Revenue Cap can 
also be modeled as a discrete-exercise option, which is exercised at discrete points over a 
pre-determined time period. While Minimum Revenue Guarantee options are intended to 
provide the concessionaire with government supports against downside traffic revenue 
risk, Traffic Revenue Cap options provide the right for the government to claim a portion 
of excess revenues when the traffic revenue is higher than the pre-specified traffic 
revenue ceiling. The payments to the government are option pay-off that changes the 
concessionaire’s revenue, as well as financial risk profile, and make up the value of 
Traffic Revenue Cap options. 






market value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options. The concessionaire needs to 
determine the impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options on its financial risk profile 
while the government needs to evaluate the cost of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options 
to the public. The conventional NPV analysis approach is not the correct method to 
evaluate investment opportunities with embedded real options, such as BOT projects with 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee options.  
Real options analysis can be used as an alternative approach to valuation of 
investments in transportation projects under uncertainties. However, the appropriate 
application of real options analysis to valuation of investments in transportation projects 
is conditioned upon overcoming specific theoretical challenges. Current real options 
models do not provide a systematic method for estimating the project volatility, which 
measures the variability of investment value. Existing models do not provide a method 
for calculating the market value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue 
Cap options. In this research a novel method for estimating the project volatility for real 
options analysis is presented. In addition, a market-based option pricing approach is 
devised that utilizes the estimated project volatility and determines the market value of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. 
Estimate Project Volatility for Real Options Analysis 
Uncertainty is the key driver of the value of a real option. Project volatility, which 
measures the uncertainty about project value over time, is one of the most critical inputs 
to any real options valuation model. The current literature on the application of real 






method for estimating the project volatility and often prescribes the use of assumptions. 
Due to this limitation, the application of the current real options models to the valuation 
of investments in BOT projects can lead to an erroneous pricing of real options such as 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap. Researchers in other domains 
have proposed the use of specific proxies for estimating the project volatility. These 
proxies are described below. 
1. Historical volatility of underlying asset: It has been proposed that, when the future 
cash flow of the project is determined by the price of an exchange-traded natural 
resource, the natural resource can be considered as the underlying asset and its 
historical volatility can be used as the volatility of the project. For instance, gold price 
returns has been used to analyze the optimal time to invest in (Kelly 1998; 
Luenberger 1998) or to close a mine (Moel and Tufano 2002). 
2. Historical volatility of a related asset: It has been proposed that, when the underlying 
asset is not traded in the market, the volatility of a related asset can be used as the 
project volatility. For instance, the volatility of retail price of lumber has been used to 
evaluate the real options on timber harvesting (Insley and Rollins 2005).  
3. Historical volatility of stock prices of a company: In some applications, the project 
volatility is assumed to be perfectly correlated with the movement of company stock 
prices. For instance, the value of a new research project in an R&D company has 
been assumed to be perfectly correlated with it stock prices (Herath and Park 2002; 
Miller and Park 2005).  
4. Historical volatility of an industrial index: In some applications, the historical 






particular project value. For instance, the volatility of pharmaceutical industry’s index 
has been used as the volatility of an R&D project focused on new drug applications 
(Cassimon et al. 2004).  
It is evident that, due to their underlying assumptions, these approaches that rely 
on using proxies for estimating the project volatility are only applicable to a few specific 
domains. These approaches cannot be used in order to estimate the project volatility in 
BOT transportation projects. Transportation project are unique and there is no exchange-
traded underlying asset or corresponding index that can be utilized as a proxy for the 
value of investments in these projects. 
In situations like this, the future cash flows of a project can be used in order to 
compute the project volatility of a project (Cobb and Charnes 2004; Copeland and 
Antikarov 2003). In this approach the project without options is considered as the 
underlying asset and, thus, its volatility is used as the project volatility in the valuation. 
The volatility of project without option is the uncertainty over expected investment 
returns from one period to the next.  
Accordingly, for BOT transportation projects, the value of project without 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap option is as an unbiased 
indicator of the market value of project. Therefore, the return on the project value can be 
used to compute the project volatility. Some key variables have to be defined first. 
Suppose there is a project that generates a series of uncertain cash flows occurring in 
future  1,2, ,tCF t T  , and a continuously compounded discount rate . The market 
value of project at time n i.e., ( )nPV is defined as the value of the cash flows that will 
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The present worth of the project at time n ( )nPW is defined as the market value at 
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Both nPV and nPW are the expected future cash flows, discounted back to time n . 
At time 0, the present worth 0( )PW is the project present value of investment. Also, for
0n  , 0 0PW PV . Suppose nR is a random variable that represents the continuously 
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from one period to the next period. In other words, the project volatility is the standard 
deviation of nR , which is the rate of return of the project between two consecutive time 
periods (i.e., 1n  and n ). A Monte Carlo simulation can be utilized in order to build the 
probability distribution of nR . The standard deviation of this simulated distribution will 
considered as the volatility of the project ( )p  in the nth period. Assuming that the 
project volatility will remain constant over time, the standard deviation of 1R can be used 
as the project volatility. If the volatility changes over time, instead of only using 1R as the 
constant project volatility, the standard deviation of nR for different values of n has to be 
calculated and a term structure of volatility should be created.  
There are two slightly different procedures for developing the probability 
distribution of 1R . Copeland and Antikarov (2003) argue that 0PV should be estimated 
once and then held constant. Therefore, the only 1PW  will be simulated. Cobb and 
Charnes (2004) have argued that 0PV and 1PW should both be considered as random 
variables and, thus, be simulated independently using different sets of random variables. 
Nevertheless, from a statistical point of view, the application of these Monte Carlo 
simulation methods for estimating volatility is problematic. These methods have a 
tendency to overestimate the project’s volatility (Godinho 2006). This problem stems 
from their approach to generation of future cash flows. These methods incorrectly 
incorporate additional sources of variations when simulating 0PV and 1PW . They include 
sources of variation in project value that are subsequent to the first year cash flows and, 
therefore, artificially increase the annualized project volatility. If used, these approaches 






volatility and hence inaccurate valuation of real options. 
In order to avoid this problem of overestimating the investment volatility shared 
by the current methods, a different Monte Carlo simulation procedure is used in this 
research. In this approach, 0PV  is calculated using the expected value of the future cash 
flows. By simulating the cash flows from the start to the end of the project life, the expected 
value of future cash flows (i.e., market value of project) can be obtained. 1PW  is calculated 
using a two level Monte Carlo simulation procedure. The first round of this Monte Carlo 
simulation generates random cash flows for the first period 1( )CF . Each iteration of the 
first level is followed by a complete simulation of the second level. The second level of 
this simulation uses the first period cash flows generated during the previous round of 
simulation as the starting point and, for each randomly generated cash flow, generates a 
series of future project cash flows. In other words the second level, estimates the 
expected future cash flows based on the first year outcome. Every iteration of the second 
step simulation creates a random path of future cash flows from first year until the end of 
project life. At the end of second level simulation, the expected cash flows for each year and 
hence the expected value of the future cash flows 1PW are estimated. Once the second level 
simulation is over, the 0PV and 1PW  are used to calculate 1R . By continuing this two level 
simulation, a distribution of 1R  can be created. The project volatility is the standard 
deviation of this distribution. The estimated project volatility will be a critical input to the 






Find the Market Value of Real Options in BOT Transportation Projects 
In order to determine the price of an option, the benefits resulted from exercising 
the option should be discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. When it comes to the 
valuation of real options in transportation projects, it is impossible to estimate the correct 
and exact risk-adjusted discount rate that reflects the market risks, project risks that are 
unique to these projects and asymmetric benefit patterns created by the options. Under 
the condition of the absence of arbitrage opportunity in the market, there is an alternative 
equivalent method to do this calculation. Instead of first taking the expectation and then 
discounting for the risk, one can first adjust the probabilities of future asset values to 
incorporate the risk effects, calculate the expectation under these risk-adjusted 
probabilities, and then, discount the expected future option pay-offs at the risk-free rate. 
These revised probabilities are just mathematical artifacts and do not exist in the real 
world. These probabilities are called risk-neural probabilities and this option pricing 
method is referred to as risk-neutral valuation approach. The option value using the risk-
neutral valuation approach is equivalent to the option value using the former direct 
approach. The major benefit of risk-neutral valuation approach is that once the risk-
neutral probabilities of the underlying asset are found, the expected option pay-offs will 
be discounted at the risk-free rate. The risk-neutral valuation approach was developed in 
mathematical finance to price options and derivatives by revising the probability 
measures of underlying assets (Luenberger 1998; Hull 2008). It is the underlying logic 
for dominant pricing models such as Black-Scholes model and is frequently used in the 
pricing of financial derivatives.  






it should be evaluated as a derivative for which the underlying asset is the future traffic 
demand. Therefore, in order to use the risk-neutral valuation and find the value of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee option, the probabilities of future traffic demand have to 
be revised and risk-neutral probabilities should be calculated. In this study, a method 
introduced by Hull (2008) is modified so that it can be used for adjusting the probabilities 
of AADT movements in the binomial lattice. The modification of the AADT binomial 
lattice for applying the risk-neutral valuation approach is described below.  
In order to derive the risk-neutral probabilities, first the actual expected growth 
rate of AADT ( ) in Equation 3.3 has to be substituted with the risk-neutral expected 
growth rate of AADT, which is denoted by  . Then, the risk-neutral probabilities of 
upward and downward movements will be calculated using this revised expected growth 
rate. In this adjustment, is the volatility of AADT and is the market price of traffic 
revenue risk, which is also called the Sharpe ratio or reward-to-variability ratio. It is a 
measure of the excess return or risk premium per unit of risk of the underlying asset. 
Using the Sharpe’s definition (1994), the risk premium of future traffic demand is 
described as follows: 
 





                            (3.15) 
 
Where R is the asset return, fr is the risk-free rate of return, and is the volatility of 
future traffic demand. The future traffic demand is not a traded asset in the financial 






investors require to bear the traffic revenue risk. Since the traffic revenue risk in the 
operations phase of the project stems from uncertainty about future traffic demand, the 
market price of risk of investment in the BOT project , which is denoted by p , must be 
identical to the market price of future traffic revenue risk, i.e., p  . The 
concessionaire’s risk premium in the project p , on the other hand, can be computed.  
The concessionaire’s excess return, which is denoted by p fR r , is the excess 
return that the concessionaire demands to invest in this project. The concessionaire’s 
return is its cost of capital ( ) that been has used as the discount rate in the calculation of 
investment value. Thus, the concessionaire’s excess return in the project is
f
r  . The 
project volatility p is estimated using the Monte Carlo estimation procedure described in 
the previous segment. Thus, the market price of future traffic demand  or the market 
price of risk of investment in the BOT project p can be calculated as follows:    








                 (3.16) 
 
The valuation of the BOT project with Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap options will be conducted using the risk-neutral binomial lattice of AADT. 
Monte Carlo technique will be used to generate random AADT paths along the risk-
neutral binomial lattice. In this study it is assumed that the concessionaire is offered with 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee option on an annual basis after the project completion, i.e., 






Guarantee options are provided free-of-charge to the concessionaire as an incentive to 
promote the private investments in public transportation infrastructure development.  
Suppose jPR is the guaranteed projected traffic revenue generated from the 
operation of the project during year j = n+1, n+2, …, N. jPR is computed based on the 
most likely value of future traffic demand – which are specified in the traffic study – as 
follows:   
 
    365     1,  2,  ...,  j j jPR Most Likely Estimated AADT Scheduled Toll Rate j n n N       (3.9) 
 
In any year, the government compensates the concessionaire based on Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee if the traffic revenue generated from the operation of the project, i.e., 
   1,  2,  ,  jOR j n n N    , falls below the respective, pre-specified and guaranteed 
traffic revenue, i.e.,    1,  2,  ,  jPR j n n N    . The Minimum Revenue Guarantee is 
offered as a    1,  2,  ,  jX j n n N     guaranteed percentage of projected revenue in 
any year as follows: 
 
 0, ( ) )   1, 2,...,j j j jMRG Max X PR OR j n n N        (3.10) 
 
Here    1,  2,  ,  jMRG j n n N    is the additional revenue in year j if the traffic 
revenue falls shorter than the pre-specified revenue in year j. These additional revenues 
will be added to respective annual traffic revenues on each random AADT path. The 






the concessionaire’s present value for each random AADT path. Therefore, the CDF will 
be created for the concessionaire’s investment value in the BOT project considering 
(possible) additional Minimum Revenue Guarantee options. The concessionaire can 
apply the described risk-neutral option pricing approach to update his financial risk 
profile in the BOT investment with Minimum Revenue Guarantee options. The market 
value (or option premium) of Minimum Revenue Guarantee is the difference between the 
concessionaire’s investment value with Minimum Revenue Guarantee options and the 
concessionaire’s investment value without any Minimum Revenue Guarantee option. 
This difference will be computed for each random AADT path to create the CDF of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee option value. The expected value of this distribution is the 
expected value or the expected premium of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options.  
The described risk-neutral pricing approach can also be used to evaluate BOT 
projects that include Traffic Revenue Cap (TRC) options in addition to the Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee options. Suppose both Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap options are available in a BOT project. The combined impact of these 
options will be considered through appropriate adjustments in the concessionaire’s 
revenue streams. The revised concessionaire’s revenue in realm of Traffic Revenue Cap 
options in year j , i.e.,    1,  2,  ,  jROR j n n N    , can be written as: 
 
    ( ), 1j j j j j jROR Min OR MRG K PR AR               (3.17) 
 






that the concessionaire can entirely claim above the projected revenue 
    1,  2,  ,  jPR j n n N     in year j . The BOT agreement between the government 
and the concessionaire will specify the values of jK .    1,  2,  ,  ARj j n n N    , is the 
additional revenue the concessionaire can claim above  1     1, ,j jK PR j n N     in 
year j as identified below: 
 
      0, 1j j j j jAR Max OR K PR T                (3.18) 
 
In this equation     1,  2,  ,jT j n n N    is the portion of revenue that the 
concessionaire can claim above  1     1,  2,  ,j jK PR j n n N      in year j . The 
BOT agreement between the government and the concessionaire will specify the values 
of jT .  
Together, Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap form a specific 
case of compound options on the BOT project. The valuation of the BOT project with the 
combined will be conducted using the risk-neutral binomial lattice of AADT. The 
concessionaire’s financial risk profile with combined Minimum Revenue Guarantee and 
Traffic Revenue Cap can be characterized using a probabilistic analysis approach on the 
project life cycle costs and revenues. Monte Carlo technique will be used to generate 
random AADT paths along the risk-neutral binomial lattice. For each random AADT 
path, the resulting annual revenues will be adjusted considering the Minimum Revenue 






traffic demand falls below the forecasted traffic demand or exceeds the specified ceiling. 
The entire project cash flows will then be discounted at risk-free rate ( )fr to compute the 
concessionaire’s present value for each random AADT path. Therefore, a CDF will be 
created for the concessionaire’s investment value in the BOT project considering the 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap risk and revenue sharing 
mechanism. The concessionaire can apply the described risk-neutral option pricing 
approach to update its investment risk profile investment with the combined Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. The market value (or option 
premium) of this risk and revenue sharing mechanism is the difference between the 
concessionaire’s investment value with Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap mechanisms and the concessionaire’s investment value without them. This 
difference will be computed for each random AADT path to create the CDF of combined 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap option value. The expected value 
of this distribution is the expected value or the expected premium of combined Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. A scenario analysis can also be 
conducted in order to answer a series of what-if questions concerning the impact of 
various Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap threshold levels on the 
concessionaire’s risk profile. 
In the next chapter, the proposed real options model is applied to the Incheon 
international Airport Highway (IIAH) project in the Republic of Korea in order to 
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construction companies that took part in this project and invested their equity in the 
project, was responsible for building, operating and maintaining the IIAH. The 
NAHC has the operating rights on this BOT project for 30 years from the date the 
construction was finished (Lee 2007).  
Traffic Demand Projections 
Initially, the IIAH project was intended to be government-funded but later 
it was decided that project be delivered using the public-private partnership model. 
As a result, the traffic and review study was conducted by the Korean ministry of 
construction and transportation. The concessionaire did not conduct an 
independent traffic and revenue study (Lee 2007). 
The traffic study report specifies that the value of annual expected growth 
rate of AADT or parameter α is 9.8% from 2001-2005, 5.3% from 2006-2010, and 
3.1% from 2011-2020. The traffic study forecasts the most-likely initial AADT to 
be 100,720. In addition, the traffic study identifies 80,576 and 120,864 as 
pessimistic and optimistic forecasts for the initial AADT respectively. Further, the 
capacity cap for future traffic demand is assumed to be 20% above the maximum 
projected AADT. 
In addition, it was assumed that the annual volatility of AADT is σ=10% to 
characterize uncertainty about future traffic demand over the project lifetime. A 
sensitivity analysis was conducted in order to determine how the changes in 






are then used to compute the AADT binomial lattice parameters – u, d, and p – as 
described in Chapter 3.  
Project Financing 
The total financing amount needed for the construction of this project was 
$1.7 billion, which was raised between 1995 and 2000. The concessionaire’s 
capital is $434 million in private equity (25% of the total financing amount) and 
$1.3 billion in syndicated loans (75% of the total financing amount). Eighteen 
banks, insurance companies, and merchant banking corporations were involved as 
lenders in this project. The details of the financing plan by year were as Table 4.1. 
 
Table  4.1Financing plan for IIAH (Source: Ministry of Construction and 
Transportation in Korea 1996) 
($ Million) 
Year Total 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Equity 434.2 40.0 244.7 149.5 - - - 
 
Private Placement 224.9 25.6 117.7 81.6 - - - 
Corporate Bond 126.7 4.3 76.9 45.5 - - - 
Loan 82.6 10.1 50.1 22.4 - - - 
Others - - - - - - - 
Debt 1,300.0 - - 306.3 408.7 271.1 313.9 
Total 1,734.2 40.0 244.7 455.8 408.7 271.1 313.9 
 
 Table 4.2 partially summarizes the concessionaire’s cash flow in the IIAH 






operations, maintenance, capital improvement costs, and debt payments. The 
concessionaire’s cash inflows are anticipated annual traffic revenues based on the 
most-likely forecasts of future traffic demand.  
 
Table  4.2 Concessionaire’s cash flow in the IIAH project 
        ($ Million) 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 …. 2030 
Financing Activities 
Inflows 




Equity 34.9 209.7 131.9     
…. 
 
Debt 253.6 351.7 240.1 279.8 …. 
Financing Activities 
Outflows       
-1.9 
  





     
45.3 208.3 …. 882.5 
Operations & 
Maintenance      
-47.2 -185.7 …. -373.7 
Investor's Net Cash 
Flow 
-34.9 -209.7 -131.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 20.6 …. 508.8 
 
 
The risk-free rate of return and the concessionaire’s cost of capital are 
specified in the project agreement between the concessionaire and the government. 
According to Lee (2007), “through negotiation between the parties in the 
consortium, it was decided that the concessionaire’s cost of capital was the sum of 
risk-free interest rf=12.56% and a 0.5% spread.” Hence, the concessionaire’s 







Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
The use of government guarantees to help persuade private investors to 
finance new infrastructure is appealing because it can allow the government to get 
the infrastructure built without paying anything immediately and to benefit from 
the skill and enterprise of private firms. The Republic of Korea, typically offers to 
guarantee infrastructure firms specified fractions of their forecast revenue. In case 
of the IIAH, the government guaranteed the 20-year projected revenues (Irwin 
2007). Based on this Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) agreement, the 
government had to pay the concessionaire a percent of the difference between the 
actual and forecasted revenue if the actual traffic revenue falls shorter than the 
forecasted revenue. These Minimum Revenue Guarantee options are available in 
any year after the project is completed until 15 years after the project completion 
date, i.e., from 2000-2014. This percent is 90% from 2000-2004, 80% from 2005-
2009, and 70% from 2010-2014. Minimum Revenue Guarantee options are 
completely terminated after 2014.The government did not have to pay anything up 
front and would get to keep a share of any revenue exceeding 110 percent of the 
forecast (Irwin 2007) through a Traffic Revenue Cap (TRC) mechanism. These 
Traffic Revenue Cap options are available in any year after the project is 
completed until 15 years after the project is built, i.e., from 2000-2015. The 
proposed real options model will be applied to this example in to price the 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap and characterize the 






is presented in the next section. 
Summary of Results 
First, a conventional NPV analysis for the IIAH project is conducted. The 
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Where n is the length of construction period in years; N is the total 
concession length in years from the initial construction to the return of the highway 
asset to the government; CCi  i = 1, 2, …, n are the annual construction costs from 
the beginning of the project until the end of construction period; OCj  j = n+1, 
n+2, …, N are the annual operations, maintenance, and rehabilitation costs from 
the first year after the project is completed until the end of concession period; PRj  
j = n+1, n+2, …, N are the forecasted annual traffic revenues from the first year 
after the project is completed until the end of concession period; and ρ is the 
discount rate. The deterministic NPV calculated according to Equation 4.1 is 
$35.37 million. This indicates that the concessionaire should invest in this BOT 
project. However, as previously discussed, the conventional NPV does not capture 
the concessionaire’s financial risk under traffic demand uncertainty. The model 
created in this research can be used to characterize the concessionaire’s financial 






demand uncertainty is characterized in an approximate discrete fashion using 
binomial lattice model. Monte Carlo simulation is applied to generate a large 
number of random AADT paths across the binomial lattice. Next, randomly 
generated AADT paths and scheduled toll rates are used for developing revenue 
streams over the concession life. For each revenue path, the present value of 
investment can be calculated. Using the investment value for randomly generated 
revenue paths are calculated, the Probability Density Function (PDF) and 
Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of the investment value of project can be 
created. Figure 4.1 shows the probability distribution of the concessionaire’s 
investment value in this project. This distribution shows all possible investment 
values and the probability of their occurrences.  
 






















Figure 4.2 (a) shows the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of 
concessionaire’s investment value and highlights the riskiness of in the IIAH 
project. There is approximately 42.5% chance that the concessionaire’s investment 
value becomes negative. Although the concessionaire’s expected NPV is much 
greater than zero ($35.37 million), there is a considerable amount of uncertainty 
about the investment value. The standard deviation of the concessionaire’s 
investment value distribution is $189.8 million due to the uncertainty about future 
traffic demand, which makes the investment in this project volatile.  
The value of BOT investments can be influenced by changes in several 
factors. Thus, the investors are encouraged to consider variety scenarios in their 
valuation and conduct a comprehensive sensitivity analysis in order to determine 
the extent to which the viability of a project is influenced by variations in major 
quantifiable variables. The model proposed in this research offers a flexible 
interface that can capture the information required for conducting the sensitivity 
analysis. The proposed valuation procedures that are at the core of this model are 
capable of incorporating this information, calculate the investment value under 
different scenarios and characterize the impact of variations in different input 
variables on concessionaire’s investment value.  
Figure 4.2 (a) shows how the CDF of concessionaire’s investment value 
changes as the annual traffic demand volatility changes from 5% to 10%, 20%, and 
30%. It can be concluded that as the traffic volatility increases, the risk of 






about the project’s future revenues increases. Thus, it becomes more likely that the 
project underperforms and the concessionaire’s investment value becomes negative. 
This great exposure to the risk of underestimating future traffic demand is the 
primary motivation for the private investors to request government supports such 
as Minimum Revenue Guarantee mechanisms. 
A primary obstacle in the utilization of BOT model is the lengthy delays in 
contract negotiation phase due to a variety of issues such as the lack of experience 
and appropriate skills among key decision makers, lengthy political debate and 
public opposition (AECOM Consult 2007; Chan et al. 2010). A prolonged contract 
negotiation phase can result in a significant deviation of the concessionaire’s 
investment value from the projected levels. This deviation is resulted from changes 
in the key variables such as construction costs and traffic revenues. Figure 4.2 (b) 
shows the change to CDF of concessionaire’s investment value under the scenario 
that due to a two-year delay in contract negotiation process, the construction cost 
has increased by a magnitude of 6%, while all other variables have remained equal 
to their value in the reference case. This increase in the construction cost shifts the 










Figure  4.2 (a) The impact of changes in the annual traffic demand volatility on the 
concessionaire’s CDF; (b) The change in concessionaire’s CDF due to delays in 
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Figure 4.3 depicts the probability distribution of the concessionaire’s log-
return present value, i.e., the probability distribution of ln (PW1/PV0). The standard 
deviation of this log-return present value distribution is 78.64% per year. This is 
the project volatility, i.e., σP=78.64% per year.  
 
 




The details of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options offered by the 
government are specified above. The proposed real options model is applied in 
order to characterize the concessionaire’s financial risk profile with Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee options. The expected growth rate of AADT was revised in 




















premium of the concessionaire’s investment in this project p , which is equal to 
the risk premium of future traffic demand , is 0.5% per year. Therefore, that 
will be subtracted from expected annual growth of AADT ( ) in order to create the 









                        (4.2) 
Figure 4.4 shows the CDF of the concessionaire’s investment value in this 
project with Minimum Revenue Guarantee options and compares it with the CDF 
of the concessionaire’s investment value in this project without Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee options. The (possible) additional revenues of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee options increase the concessionaire’s expected investment value from 
$35.81 million to $70.87 million. Also the chance that the concessionaire’s 
investment value becomes negative reduces from 42.52% to 35.39%. Hence, the 
concessionaire’s financial risk profile shifts to the right when Minimum Revenue 







Figure  4.4 CDF of the concessionaire’s investment value in the IIAH project with 
and without MRG options 
 
In addition, Figure 4.5 shows the probability distribution of the value of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee options in this project. This value is computed as the 
difference between the concessionaire’s investment values with and without 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee option. The expected value of this distribution is the 
expected premium of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options, i.e., $14.42 Million. 
This is the market-based premium, which the government implicitly offers to the 
concessionaire in this BOT project through considering Minimum Revenue 




























Figure  4.5 Probability distribution of the value of MRG options 
 
It is important to study the significance of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
options from the government standpoint. Figure 4.5 can also be considered as the 
probability distribution of the present value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
options paid by the government over the concession lifetime. It can be noticed that 
there is approximately 56% chance that the present value of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee options become zero. This occurs when actual traffic demand is higher 
than forecasted traffic demand and therefore, the concessionaire never requests 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee options. The distribution of the Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee present value depends on the number of times that the concessionaire 






















Figure 4.6 shows the probability distribution of the number of times that 
the concessionaire may request Minimum Revenue Guarantee options in the first 
15 years of the concession lifetime. The number of times that the concessionaire 
may request Minimum Revenue Guarantee from the government is variable and 
can take any values from 0 to 15. It can be seen that there is approximately 56% 
chance that the concessionaire never requests Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
options and, therefore, the present value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee options 
becomes zero. This probability drops sharply to approximately 10% for one 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee exercise and continues to decrease until 15 possible 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee option exercises.  
 
Figure  4.6 Probability distribution of the number of times that the concessioner 
























The government also needs information about how likely it is that the 
concessionaire requests Minimum Revenue Guarantee in any year after the project 
is completed. Figure 4.7 shows how likely it is that the concessionaire requests 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee in 2000, 2001, …, 2014. This likelihood drops twice 
in 2005 and 2010 due to the structural changes in the percentage of revenue 
shortfalls for calculating Minimum Revenue Guarantee options, i.e., the initial 90% 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee coverage rate will be reduced to 80% and 70% in 
2005 and 2010, respectively. On the other hand, the probability that the 
concessionaire requests Minimum Revenue Guarantee increases from 2000-2004, 
2005-2009, and 2010-2014. In any of these three distinct periods, forecasted future 
traffic demand increase rapidly based on the traffic study report. However, this 
report does not address the volatility of future AADTs. The rising AADT forecasts 
combined with the volatility of future traffic demand increase the probability that 
actual AADTs become smaller than forecasted AADTs. Figure 4.7 shows how the 
risk of underestimating the AADT grows as the BOT project advances. It can be 
seen that relying on just forecasted future traffic demand can be problematic for the 
government. As the project advances, the government is more likely to pay 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee options to the concessionaire if it does not consider 










Figure  4.7 Probability distribution that the concessioner requests MRG option from 
2000 to 2014 
 
The amount of Minimum Revenue Guarantee, which is requested by the 
concessionaire in any year, is also variable. For instance, Figure 4.8 illustrates the 
probability distribution of Minimum Revenue Guarantee, which is requested from 
the government in 2004. It is shown that there is a great chance (approximately 
76%) that the concessionaire does not request Minimum Revenue Guarantee in 
2004. The expected value and standard deviation of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
distribution in 2004 are $6.52 million and $15.19 million, respectively. This 
distribution shows the inherent uncertainty about the amount of requested 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee in any year. This is a great challenge for the 


























when related to the BOT project.  
 
 
Figure  4.8 Probability distribution of MRG requested by the concessionaire in 
2004 
 
Figure 4.9 summarizes the expected values of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
distributions in every year between 2000 and 2014. This graph shows the expected 
value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee payments to the concessionaire by the 

























Figure  4.9 Expected value of MRG payments by the government between 2000 
and 2014 
 
The Korean government shares the risk of overestimating future traffic 
demand with the concessionaire through offering Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
options. The concessionaire also shares the excess revenues with the Korean 
government through offering Traffic Revenue Cap options. The details of Traffic 
Revenue Cap options requested by the government are specified above. The 
proposed real options model is applied in order to characterize the concessionaire’s 
financial risk profile with Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
options. Figure 4.10 shows the CDF of the concessionaire’s investment value with 
both Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options and 












































Minimum Revenue Guarantee options and without any options in the IIAH project. 
The concessionaire’s access to extremely high revenues will be limited through 
offering of Traffic Revenue Cap options to the government. Hence, it can be seen 
that the expected value and standard deviation of the concessionaire’s investment 
value distribution with Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap 
options are lower than the expected value and standard deviation of the 
concessionaire’s investment value distribution with just Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee options, respectively. However, the expected value of the 
concessionaire’s investment value distribution with Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
and Traffic Revenue Cap options is greater than the expected value of the 
concessionaire’s investment value distribution with just Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee options. Also, the probability of the event that the concessionaire’s 
investment value becomes negative is lower when the concessionaire considers 
both Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options compared to 








Figure  4.10 CDF of the concessionaire’s investment value under 3 circumstances: 
(1) with both MRG and TRC; (2) with just MRG options; and (3) without any 
options 
 
Further, Figure 4.11 characterizes the probability distribution of the present 
value of Traffic Revenue Cap options. This probability distribution specifies all 
possible present values of total excess revenues that the Korean government 
receives under Traffic Revenue Cap options. The expected value and standard 
deviation of this distribution are $16.38 million and $21.79 million, respectively. 
There is approximately 36% chance that the Korean government does not receive 
any additional revenues through Traffic Revenue Cap options. This probability is 
lower than the 56% chance that the concessionaire never requests Minimum 



























government. Excess revenues, if they occur, can be collected and used to pay the 
concessionaire as Minimum Revenue Guarantee options if requested.  
 
 
Figure  4.11 Probability distribution of the present value of TRC options 
 
Figure 4.12 characterizes the probability distribution of the government’s 
net present value of Traffic Revenue Cap and Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
options. This probability distribution specifies all possible net present values of 
total excess revenues – which the Korean government receives under Traffic 
Revenue Cap options – subtracting all Minimum Revenue Guarantees that it pays 
to the concessionaire over the project lifetime. The expected value and standard 




















respectively. The asymmetry in the shape of this probability distribution indicates 
that the above Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options will 
possibly be in the favor of the Korean government. It can be seen that the 
probability that the government realizes a gain (i.e., the probability of the event 
that the government’s present value of Traffic Revenue Cap and Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee options is positive) is approximately 58.1%. 
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Limitations of the Proposed Real Options Model 
The proposed real options model is subject to specific limitations. These 
limitations are discussed in this section. 
Single Source of Uncertainty 
The first limitation is concerned with the scope of the research. In order 
to create an investment valuation model applicable to the BOT transportation 
projects, the research should capture all the essential factors that can impact the 
value of a project. Among these factors are commercial, macro-economic and 
political risks that in reality govern the value of investment in a BOT project. For 
instance, stated preference surveys are typically conducted in order to obtain 
detailed information on the probable effects of changes to the transport 
infrastructure systems (e.g., changes in toll rates) and the sensitivity and response 
of travelers to these changes (Kriger et al. 2006). These surveys ask current users 
of the freeway to determine the implied values of time based on tradeoffs within 
specific questions. These time-cost, tradeoff questions offer the respondents 
choices based on travel alternatives. Nevertheless, it has been known that the 
conclusions from stated preference surveys are subject to biases, errors and 
uncertainties due to many factors including the complex behavior of individual 
travelers (Lu et al. 2006). Therefore, stated preference surveys cannot accurately 
characterize the changes in long-term behavior of travelers as a result of changes in 






and service quality levels (Koonc 1998; Research and Innovative Technology 
Administration 2012).  
Similarly, the uncertain variation of factors such as the exchange rate and 
the interest rate and the can affect the value of investment a BOT transportation 
project. These uncertainties and their interrelations should be among the 
fundamental inputs for the real options valuation of a BOT project. Nevertheless, 
the scope of this research is limited to capturing and modeling traffic demand 
uncertainty, which the literature identify as one of the most important uncertainties 
that can affect the value of BOT projects.  
Estimation of Input Parameters for Uncertainty Modeling 
Another limitation of this research is related to the method used for 
modeling the traffic demand uncertainty and some of the underlying assumptions 
about the long-term behavior of traffic demand that may be distant from the reality.  
In this research, a binomial lattice model, which is a form of the random 
walk model, was used to capture the dynamic uncertainty about the long-term 
traffic demand in an approximate and discrete fashion. This modeling choice is 
consistent with the general body of knowledge in real options analysis (Hull 2008; 
Luenberger 1998). Nevertheless, there are some challenges in implementing this 
modeling approach. For instance, the construction of proposed binomial model 
requires the estimating of two fundamental inputs: the expected annual growth rate 






accurate estimates of these inputs especially in case of a greenfield transportation 
project since there is no relevant historical traffic demand data that can be used for 
as the basis for estimation.  
In spite of significant improvements of the transport demand models 
over the past few decades, the current traffic demand models are still incapable of 
characterizing the uncertainty of long-term traffic demand systematically (Matas et 
al. 2012). Transport demand models, which are commonly used around the world, 
project the traffic demand volumes and traffic flows on specific network links 
based on a single scenario or, at most, a limited number of scenarios. These models 
attempt to predict the likely impacts of transport infrastructure projects (e.g. new 
roads, wider roads, new railway lines) and transport policies (e.g. road pricing). 
Nevertheless, all these predictions are point estimates, and, even when produced 
for several scenarios, do not give insight into the uncertainty margin that exists 
around the projections (Jong et al. 2007; Matas et al. 2012). The literature on the 
appropriate methods for quantifying uncertainty in traffic forecasts is limited and 
the research efforts focused on characterizing the input uncertainty (e.g. on the 
future incomes and car ownership levels) and model uncertainty (e.g., specification 
error and error due to using parameter estimates instead of the true values) are still 
evolving (Jong et al. 2007).  
The value of annual expected growth rate of AADT or parameter α can 
be retrieved from the traffic study report. However, due to the limitations of 






may be subject to errors. The annual volatility of AADT ( ) , which is not typically 
provided by the traffic and revenue study can be estimated using the historical 
AADT data of similar existing highway projects (Irwin 2003), or the forecasted 
annual volatility of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the region (Banister 2005) 
or the subject matter experts’ opinions (Brandão and Saraiva 2008). This approach 
to estimating the annual volatility of AADT is also subject to errors. Thus, a 
sensitivity analysis is proposed in order to evaluate how the changes in traffic 
demand volatility impact the investors’ financial risk profiles and also check the 
rationality of the assumption about the traffic demand volatility.  
In addition, the proposed approach assumes that the traffic demand 
volatility is constant over time. The use of binomial model also implies that large 
movements in the traffic demand do not occur, and the changes in the traffic 
demand levels are independent over time. These assumptions may not hold in 
reality. 
Adoption and Implementation Barriers  
Although the capacity of real options to add value to projects has been 
adequately demonstrated by academic literature, evidence indicates that the 
attempts to disseminate real options widely in practice have been largely failed 
(Krychowski and Quelin 2010; Sandahl and Sjogren 2003; Waldron 2000). In fact 
closing the gap between real options theory and the derived pricing models and 






formidable challenge faced by academics involved in real options research (Garvin 
and Ford 2012; Wan 2007).  
Ford and Garvin (2010), Triantis (2005) and (Krychowski and Quelin 
2010) provide an insight into the most common barriers to real options adoption 
and use by the practitioners in general. In the infrastructure development and 
construction project management, the gap between real options theory and 
infrastructure project practices seems to be wide due to the nature of industry and 
the characteristics of infrastructure projects. Thus, similar to existing real options 
models, the model created in this research faces a variety of barriers that have been 
known to limit the adoption and use of real options in infrastructure development. 
An overview of these barriers is presented below. 
Exposure-Based Perspective 
It should be understood that options do not necessarily increase the 
project value even if they are accurately priced and their price is justified from the 
financial point of view. The impact of an option on a project value depends on the 
way the underlying uncertainty evolves throughout the project life. If the 
uncertainty resolves such that the option should not be exercised, then the 
development and integration of the option in the contract does not lead to any 
enhancement of value for the option holder. This in fact may decrease the project 
value if there are costs associated with the development and incorporation of 
options in the project contract. The pricing and recommendation of these options is 






capture the average of all the benefits and losses.  
The current practices in the infrastructure development and management 
discipline often contradict this assumption. In this discipline, practitioners often 
face the circumstances in which they have to make decisions with many long-term 
implications and consequences at once early in the project. This encourages an 
exposure-based perspective of risk. From this perspective, the uncertainties 
associated with the project are often perceived as the origins of risk that can 
threaten the success of a project. When practitioners adopt the exposure-based 
perspective, they likely to act conservatively and only take on low-risk projects. 
The exposure-based perspective also assumes that the worst-case scenario will be 
the mostly likely event and, thus, the practitioners should give the highest priority 
to improving their value in worst-case scenario instead of maximizing their 
expected value by using appropriate mechanisms such as real options. As a result, 
the options that can increase the expected value of a project (e.g., risk and revenue 
sharing mechanisms) may be overlooked in favor of the strategies that are designed 
to work only in the worst-case scenario. 
Practitioners’ Hope-for-the-best Attitude  
Often, firms cannot afford to request the loss-limiting options (e.g., the 
minimum revenue guarantee) in their proposals and survive in today’s highly 
competitive market. The reason is that, typically, there are competitors that assume 
no loss-limiting mechanism is required since the uncertainty will resolve in their 






costs to others (e.g., through contract renegotiations or buyback arrangement). This 
“hope-for-the-best” practice of not including adequate protection for uncertain 
conditions is fatal to overly optimistic firms in the long run. However, in short 
term, it motivates these firms to reduce their price proposals. This put these firms 
in advantage compared to firms that are more concerned with the uncertainties in 
the project and request loss-limiting options (e.g., minimum revenue guarantees) in 
their proposals. In the BOT context, the proposers that request government 
guarantees in order to manage the downside risk will be in competitive 
disadvantage compared to those firms that are optimistic about the way the demand 
uncertainty will evolve in future and do not request for government support. 
Risk Aversion in Valuing Real Options 
Similar to many other disciplines, practitioners in the infrastructure 
development and management discipline have tendency to be risk-averse; they are 
willing to sacrifice some benefits in order to reduce uncertainty. Practitioners 
demonstrate their risk aversion regularly when choosing among alternative projects 
and strategies with different amounts of uncertainty and reward. For instance, 
given two otherwise equal strategies, practitioners in general prefer the strategy for 
which the success and value is less dependent on the resolution of uncertainty. 
They may also tacitly implement risk aversion by adding a cost in their valuation 
of real options that reflects their level of risk aversion. This would decrease the 
attractiveness of real options relative to more certain alternatives and thereby 






capture the risk aversion costs included in the valuation due to practitioners’ 
perspectives. These managerial risk aversion costs reduce the perceived value and 
attractiveness of real options.   
Industry Practices and Assumptions of Real Options Pricing Models 
Some of the common practices in the infrastructure development and 
management discipline vary from the fundamental assumptions of most real 
options pricing models. These differences lead to incorrect valuation of real 
options, which contributes to limited adoption of real options. 
There are many possible actions that practitioners can take in order to 
increase the project value. Some of these can be structured as options while many 
others cannot be constructed as options. In cases where practitioners have access to 
a variety of alternative to manipulate the project uncertainties and increase project 
values, the potential benefits of integrating real options in projects is limited 
(Trigeorgis 1996).  
Moreover, most real option models assume that the option holder does 
not have influence on the value of underlying asset. The foundations of this 
assumption originate from option pricing models for financial assets (e.g. stocks in 
a market that can reasonably be assumed to be perfect) in which the option holder 
is independent of the asset except through the market. Nevertheless, the 
practitioners in the infrastructure development and management discipline 
typically have the capability and means to make adjustments that change the level 






valuation concerning the independence of the option holder and uncertainty 
independence. Therefore, the current real options pricing models that assume 
independence of option holders and uncertainties do not price strategies accurately 
and cannot be used to guide practitioners. They price real options incorrectly by 
reducing their value. This in turn reduces the possibility of justifying and using real 
options in infrastructure development projects. 
Resource Inadequacy 
Real options theory assumes that when an option adds value, the 
potential holder of the option will create and maintain this option for the project. 
Nevertheless, creating and maintaining options often requires the commitment of 
resources that may be scarce. Limitations on various types of resources required 
for structuring or maintaining real options in an infrastructure project restrict the 
utilization of real options. Among the required resources for structuring real 
options in an infrastructure project are the cognitive abilities, tools, and methods 
required to understand, design, evaluate, and implement options. Moreover, time 
and team efforts are required to recognize and use options and other value-adding 
alternatives in an infrastructure. In the infrastructure development and management 
projects, many choices and decisions are often made based on a benefit– cost ratio 
analysis that aims at maximizing the total project value derived from a given set of 
limited resources. Therefore, alternatives with the largest perceived benefit-cost 
ratio are often chosen first. Along with other challenges, substantial resources 








The classic agency problem may arise if some of the participants in an 
infrastructure project are not seeking to merely increase the financial value of an 
asset. This is in direct contrast with the fundamentals of option theory. In some 
cases, real options are valued and assessed in dimensions that cannot be measured 
with money, or at least with project money. For instance, options can be to increase 
competition among the potential bidders in the project as well as to reduce costs. 
The presence of factors other than economic product value changes the 
environment for real options analysis substantially. This can lead to an increase in 
the perceived value of certain options that may not necessarily enhance the value 
of the project. This also suggests that practitioners may have various motivations 
as well as means to manipulate or influence asset values, hence changing the value 
of real options in an infrastructure project. This may reduce the perceived value of 
options that merely focus on the enhancement of expected value for the project 
including the risk sharing mechanisms. 
Bounded Rationality 
Similar to other disciplines, there is an upper limit to the cognitive 
capacity of practitioners in the infrastructure development and management 
discipline. Although, a variety of management tools can expand the practitioners’ 






the infrastructure development projects often approaches or exceeds the cognitive 
capacity of project managers and project management teams. The integration of 
real options in a project can only increase the project complexity. Typically, 
practitioners prefer the strategies that are simpler to those that are more complex 
ones. An infrastructure project with many complex contractual mechanisms such 
as various kinds of real options is generally less attractive to the practitioners. This 
can decrease the attractiveness and utilization of real options since, from the 
perspective of practitioners, they increase the management complexity. 
Overcoming the Limitations of the Current Model 
There are three fundamental areas of improvement that are central to 
improving the real options model presented in this research and enhancing its 
applicability:  
1. Assumptions, which is concerned with the critical assumptions that underlie the 
modeling approach and the evidence regarding the validity of these 
assumptions; 
2. Mechanics, which is concerned with steps involved in applying the approach, 
and the associated challenges; and 
3. Applicability, which is concerned with the practitioners’ understanding of the 
value that options thinking and real options analysis offer, and providing 
practitioners with the opportunities to use them. 
While making improvements in the first two areas (assumptions and 






reflect current real world practice, the last (applicability) is more concerned with 
improving the options thinking skills of practitioners and enhancing their 
understanding about the value of real options. Each of these approaches is 
discussed in more details below. 
Relax Assumptions Concerning the BOT Uncertainties 
The current model considers the traffic demand uncertainty as the only 
risk factor that can impact the value of a BOT project. However, the assumption 
that the project value is affected by one risk factor can only be correct for very 
simple types of projects. Infrastructure projects are typically very complex and it is 
impossible to assume that their value is only affected by one risk factor (i.e., traffic 
demand uncertainty). The real options valuation of complex infrastructure projects 
requires the consideration of several interdependent variables representing various 
risk factors that impact the value of a project. Therefore, the model should be 
expanded in order to include not only the revenue risk stemmed from the traffic 
demand uncertainty but also other commercial, macro-economic and political risk 
that in reality govern the financial value of investments in BOT projects.  
This requires a comprehensive study of the nature of different 
uncertainties as well as the potential interrelationships among them. These should 
be characterized and incorporated in the valuation of BOT projects. Uncertainty is 
the key driver of option value. Therefore, studying and characterizing the trends 






valuable insight on how appropriate mechanisms can be developed and utilized for 
managing these uncertainties. Various kinds of real options can be designed for 
mitigating the risks in BOT projects. Therefore, the proposed real options valuation 
model should be expanded to incorporate different options designed to manage 
various uncertainties in the BOT projects. If many options are considered at the 
same time or sequentially, there will also be a need for the expansion of current 
model so that it can treat a combination of options when evaluating the investments 
in BOT projects. 
Improve Modeling Procedure 
In this research a novel approach for estimation of the project volatility, 
which is one of the critical parameters in valuation of real options, was presented. 
Nevertheless, research on more accurate models that can characterize the critical 
inputs to the real options valuation model is still needed.  
In this research, a binomial lattice model was used to capture the 
dynamic uncertainty about the future traffic demand. This modeling choice is 
consistent with the general body of knowledge in real options analysis. However, 
its application implies that the traffic demand volatility is constant, large 
movements in the traffic demand do not occur, and the changes in the traffic 
demand level are independent over time. Moreover, estimating the expected annual 
growth rate of AADT ( ) and the annual volatility of AADT ( ) , which are the 






traffic models do not provide accurate projections of future demand. Also, they are 
generally unable to provide an insight into the uncertainty margin that exists 
around these projections. These issues underline the need for suitable traffic 
models that incorporate a variety of relevant socio-economic factors and present 
the possible range of future traffic demand and the probabilities attached to these 
possible outcomes in an appropriate fashion. These traffic models enhance the 
understanding about how the traffic demand evolves over time and, also, facilitate 
a more appropriate estimation of parameters such as expected annual growth rate 
and annual volatility of traffic demand.  
Overcome Barriers to Real Options Application  
Real options can be used as an analytical tool, a mode of thinking, and an 
organizational process. In its essence, real options analysis allows practitioners to 
value strategic decisions using appropriate analytical criteria and, thus, establishes 
a tie between the strategic decisions of an organization and their financial value. It 
helps the practitioners decide what measures should be considered so that 
investment in a project can move successfully into the next stage.  
However, some organizations have faced difficulties with the integration 
of real options analysis into their business strategy. The key to successful 
implementation of real options analysis is to give priority to options thinking and 
gathering various management tools, processes and techniques under the real 






The efforts should also focus on enhancing the options thinking skills of 
practitioners. These options thinking skills can be improved by building upon basic 
project management concepts, tools, and methods (Ford and Garvin 2010). 
Educating practitioners and providing them with appropriate practical heuristics 
that reflect both real options theory and practice can help them effectively 
implement options thinking and real options analysis in various aspects of their 
projects.  
A widespread misunderstanding of real options analysis is that it 
encourages risk-taking while, in fact, real options in concerned with approaching 
uncertainty as a source of opportunity. This approach to responding to uncertainty 
distinguishes option-thinking from the traditional management practices. The 
practitioners should appreciate that when it comes to dealing with uncertainties, 
real options analysis is more opportunity-focused rather than risk-focused. This 
shift in perspective - from minimizing investment due to the fear of uncertainty to 
seeking gains from uncertainty by maximizing learning - can be achieved by 
educating the practitioners and improving their understanding of real options. 
Using options thinking and real options analysis provides the practitioners with a 
wider range of possible actions that can be taken in order to deal with uncertain 
circumstances. For instance, the governments can lower initial irreversible 
investments cost and mitigate the financial risk of overinvestment in transportation 
infrastructure by expanding existing transportation systems. Real options analysis 
can be used in order to determine the optimal traffic level, and hence the optimal 







In addition, it is important to highlight the usefulness of real options 
analysis as a strategic tool rather than a valuation model. A successful strategy 
emerges from decision processes that take into account different viewpoints. Real 
options has the capability of integrating the concerns of various stakeholders 
(Eisenhardt 1999; Krychowski and Quelin 2010). Thus, options thinking and real 
options analysis can become integrated in the business strategies of an organization 
rather than being treated as independent from other business strategies. The 
practitioners should understand that there can be a close tie between competitive 
strategy and option-thinking. They should be educated and trained in order to 
realize that not only competition can give rise to a variety of real options, but 
option-thinking can also be widely applied on strategic level in order to shape an 
organization’s future competitive strategies. The key is to educate the practitioners 
so they could identify the latent “shadow options” in their projects and incorporate 
appropriate options in their firms’ strategies and define to what extent aligning 
their business strategies with real option logic may affect competitive advantage 
(Bowman and Hurry 1993). 
Moreover, real options techniques cannot be treated as independent from 
other features of the organization (Gordon and Stark 2000). The practitioners 
should realize that options thinking can become an effective tool for addressing the 
internal challenges of an organization. On this level, considering the management 
structure, resources, organization culture, organization’s competitive advantages 






to improve performance or address organization’s challenges and limitations. 
There are tools and systems that can help organizations integrate options thinking 
and real options analysis in their internal decision-making. Among these tools is an 
information system that is capable of providing the necessary data for the 
identification and development of appropriate options as well as an incentive 
system capable of motivating managers to identify and utilize options in order to 
enhance that value for the organization. Detailed processes models can be designed 
in order provide practitioners with additional guidance and a framework for 
utilizing their options thinking skills. 
Practitioners in the transportation infrastructure development and 
management tend to focus on the delivery of physical asset rather than focusing on 
strategic and systematic processes for operating, maintaining, upgrading and 
expanding transportation assets throughout their lifecycle. There should be a 
paradigm change in the management of transportation infrastructure. Enhancing 
the option thinking skills of practitioners and decisions makers in transportation 
agencies can facilitate this paradigm shift. Through the use of real options analysis, 
transportation agencies and practitioners can evaluate opportunities for improving 
the lifecycle of transportation infrastructure and decide how scarce resources 
should be deployed in order to deliver safe and adequate transportation 
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interest rate risks (Smith, 2009). Therefore, for BOT projects there is a broader 
spectrum of risks that can impact the project outcomes. A relevant BOT project 
risk that may seriously undermine the profitability of a project is the revenue risk. 
Revenue risk is stemmed from the uncertainty about the future traffic demand and 
is concerned with the possibility that the project may not generate sufficient 
revenue to cover its operating costs, service the debt and leave an adequate return 
for investors.  
Revenue risk mitigation has strategic relevance for BOT private 
participants since revenue risk can adversely impact the profitability of a BOT 
project and prevent its successful implementation. In fact, the private participation 
in many BOT transportation projects is conditioned upon the existence of proper 
mechanisms for mitigating the revenue risk. In order to encourage private 
investment in BOT transportation projects, governments usually assume a portion 
of the revenue risk by offering Minimum Revenue Guarantee options to the 
concessionaire. By offering the Minimum Revenue Guarantee options, the 
government compensates the concessionaire if the revenue falls below a specified 
threshold. A similar mechanism can be applied to share the surplus revenue when 
the traffic demand grows significantly beyond the projected levels. This 
mechanism is often referred to as Traffic Revenue Cap. Combined together, 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options create a risk and 
revenue sharing mechanism. 
The conventional valuation methods including NPV analysis are incapable 






uncertainty about future traffic demand. The conventional valuation methods are 
also unable to address the impact of risk and revenue sharing mechanism on the 
financial value of BOT projects and determine their market value. 
Evidence indicate that the improper financial valuation of BOT projects 
and the risk-sharing mechanisms between the private and public sectors can 
contribute to the failure of these projects and consequently, reduce the participation 
of the private sector in development of transportation infrastructure systems. To 
address this challenge, in this research a novel financial model is created to 
evaluate BOT projects under uncertainty about future traffic demand. 
It is necessary to price Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue 
Cap risk and revenue sharing mechanisms so that its market value and its effects 
on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile can be determined. Moreover, pricing 
this mechanism establishes the extent of financial compensation that government 
receives by assuming a portion of the revenue risk. The valuation model created in 
this research utilizes the real options theory from finance/decision science in order 
to explicitly price Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options 
in BOT projects. 
This model captures the future traffic demand uncertainty in BOT projects 
in a stochastic manner and integrates it in the valuation of BOT projects. Thus, the 
concessionaire’s financial risk profile can be characterized under the traffic 
demand uncertainty. It is shown that as the traffic volatility increases, the 
uncertainty about the project’s future revenues increases and it becomes more 






becomes negative. It is also concluded that the risk of underestimating future 
traffic demand grows as the BOT project advances. 
The proposed model is able to overcome the inherent limitation of 
conventional financial analysis methods and most notably the NPV approach. The 
NPV approach is insufficient to determine the market value of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. Determining the optimal threshold of 
these mechanisms cannot also be done through conventional investment valuation 
methods and requires the use of option pricing techniques. The proposed model 
devises a market-based option pricing approach to determine the correct value of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. It is shown how 
this model can be used to determine how different Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
and Traffic Revenue Cap thresholds affect the project value. It is concluded that the 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee mechanism can be a viable financial incentive in 
cases where the high levels of traffic demand uncertainty reduce the potential of 
the private sector investment in infrastructure projects. Moreover, it is shown that 
the Traffic Revenue Cap can be an effective mechanism for sharing the “upside” 
potential between the concessionaires and the government by splitting the surplus 
revenue resulted from excessive growth of the traffic demand beyond the 
anticipated levels. It is shown that as the project advances, the government is more 
likely to pay Minimum Revenue Guarantee options to the concessionaire if it does 
not consider the volatility of future traffic demand in the project valuation. 
It is concluded that the expected value and standard deviation of the 






and Traffic Revenue Cap options are lower than the expected value and standard 
deviation of the concessionaire’s investment value distribution with just Minimum 
Revenue Guarantee options, respectively. However, the expected value of the 
concessionaire’s investment value distribution with Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
and Traffic Revenue Cap options is greater than the expected value of the 
concessionaire’s investment value distribution without Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee options. Also, the probability of the event that the concessionaire’s 
investment value becomes negative is lower when the concessionaire considers 
both Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options compared to 
the case without any options. It is also demonstrated that since Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms have an asymmetric impact on 
the value of the project, they may be an acceptable solution to all stakeholders 
involved. This would allow governments leverage their investment capabilities by 
redirecting scarce resources away from financing public infrastructure investment 
to providing a limited level of guarantees, as long as precautions are taken in 
selecting government project portfolio. 
The proposed model can help public and private sectors better analyze and 
understand the financial risk of BOT projects. The private sector can use this 
innovative model to make better entry decisions to BOT highway projects 
considering the level of support provided by the government. The government can 
also use this model in order to calibrate the level of revenue guarantee required for 
a specified degree of risk reduction and set the appropriate Minimum Revenue 






future budgetary strength. The proper levels of Traffic Revenue Cap can also be 
identified as a reward-sharing strategy to enhance the government’s spending 
flexibility in highway projects without hurting the financial success of the 
concessionaire. It is shown that an appropriate combination of Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options is an effective risk-and–reward sharing 
strategy between the government and the concessionaire in the BOT project. This 
limits the exposures of both parties to the risk of underestimating or overestimating 
future traffic demand. 
Contributions to State of Knowledge 
The real options model created in this research contributes to the body of 
knowledge on the application of real options in transportation infrastructure 
management. These contributions are summarized below. 
A Method for Estimating the BOT Project Volatility for Real 
Options Analysis 
One of the critical inputs to real options valuation models is the project 
volatility that measures the uncertainty about project value over time. In case of 
investments in transportation projects, it is very difficult to estimate the project 
volatility directly or using proxies since transportation projects are unique and 
there is no relevant data on historical or current market prices of the transportation 






2004; Copeland and Antikarov 2003). The current literature on the application of 
real options in transportation infrastructure management does not provide a 
systematic method for estimating the project volatility and often prescribes the use 
of assumptions. Therefore, the application of the current real options models to the 
valuation of investments in BOT projects under the uncertainty about future traffic 
demand can lead to an erroneous valuation. In this research a volatility estimation 
approach that combines Monte Carlo simulation and the stochastic processes is 
presented. In this approach, the investment without options is considered as 
underlying asset of the real options investment and, its volatility is used as the 
volatility in the real options valuation. The volatility of investment without option 
is considered to be the uncertainty over expected investment returns from one 
period to the next. This method, which is comprised of two Monte Carlo 
simulation rounds, can be applied in order to estimate the volatility for real options 
that is the most critical input to the valuation of investments in BOT projects.  
Risk-neutral Valuation of Real Options in BOT Projects 
In order to determine the price of an option, the benefits resulted from 
exercising the option should be discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. 
When it comes to the valuation of real options in transportation projects, it is 
typically impossible to estimate the correct and exact risk-adjusted discount rate 
that reflects the market risks, project risks that are unique to these projects and 






2002). The existing literature on the application of real options in transportation 
infrastructure management does not address this problem and often suggest the 
utilization of approximate discount rates for real options valuation. Therefore, the 
application of the current real options models to the valuation BOT investments 
under traffic demand uncertainty does not lead to the determination of correct 
market value of real options. In this research, a novel method was presented so that 
the estimated project volatility can be used for determining the market value of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options. In this approach, 
instead of first taking the expectation and then discounting for the risk, one can 
first adjust the probabilities of AADT movements in order to incorporate the risk 
effects, calculate the expectation under these risk-adjusted probabilities, and then, 
discount the expected future option pay-offs at the risk-free rate. These 
probabilities are called risk-neural probabilities and this option pricing method is 
referred to as risk-neutral valuation approach. The valuation model presented in 
this research utilizes this market-based risk-neutral option pricing approach in 
order to determine the fair value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic 
Revenue Cap mechanisms in BOT projects.  
The proposed real options model also contributes to the growing body of 
knowledge in the application of real options in built environment. Most notable 
application areas real options in built environment are building technology (Ashuri 
et al. 2011; Greden et al. 2006; Kolahdoozan and Ashuri 2010), and corporate real 
estate (Ashuri 2010; Cunningham 2006; Guma et al. 2009). The proposed real 






valuation procedure that can be adopted in the valuation of real options in built 
environment.    
Contributions to State of Practice: A Novel Class of Assessment 
Tools for Decision Makers 
The current real options models for transportation infrastructure projects do 
not address several critical questions when it comes to the valuation of investments 
BOT project under traffic demand uncertainty. These models do not provide an 
insight into the impact of traffic demand uncertainty as well as risk and revenue 
sharing mechanisms on the concessionaire’s financial risk profile. They are also 
unable to characterize the financial implications of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
and Traffic Revenue Cap mechanisms for the government. 
The model presented in this dissertation provides a novel class of 
assessment tools that address these concerns. It helps the public and private sector 
participants in making decision about the entering into a BOT contract. By 
evaluating the concessionaire’s financial risk profile under uncertainty about future 
traffic demand, the model presented in this research evaluates the impact of 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap options on the 
concessionaire’s financial risk profile. In addition, the proposed model is capable 
of determining the probability of Minimum Revenue Guarantee payment request 
by the Concessionaire as well as the probability that the public sector receives a 
share of surplus revenue as part of Traffic Revenue Cap agreement. Further, the 






concessionaire requests the Minimum Revenue Guarantee option, and the number 
of times that the public sector receives additional revenue. Finally, this model 
identifies the distribution of the present value of Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
options, and the present value of total additional revenues recalled by the public 
sector.   
In the course of evaluating the opportunity to invest in a BOT project, the 
concessionaire can use this valuation model to determine the market value and the 
financial risk profile of the investment opportunity with more confidence in the 
valuation results. The proposed real options approach can complement the 
traditional assessment methods such cost- benefit analysis as well as the more 
recent methods such as value for Money (VfM), which are typically used to 
evaluate the public sector’s opportunities to invest in transportation infrastructure. 
Value for money (VfM) assessment has been recently used by various public 
agencies worldwide as a tool to compare the viability of pursuing a project as a 
Public–Private Partnership with traditional procurement (Morallos et al. 2009). The 
proposed real options model is capable of enhancing these assessment models. 
Governments can use the proposed real options model to identify the appropriate 
Minimum Revenue Guarantee and Traffic Revenue Cap thresholds, and avoid 
conferring substantial subsidies or undervaluing investment opportunities in BOT 
projects. 
Recommendations for Further Research 






research threads are recommended for further studies: 
1. The model created in this research considers the traffic demand uncertainty as 
factor that can impact the revenue and hence value of a BOT project. However, 
infrastructure projects are very complex and their value is affected by many 
risk factors. Therefore, the current model should be expanded in order to 
include not only the revenue risk but also other commercial, macro-economic 
and political risk that in reality govern the financial value of investments in 
BOT projects. This requires a study of the nature of different uncertainties as 
well as their potential interrelationships. Studying and understanding the 
uncertain factors in BOT projects can provide valuable insight on how 
appropriate real options can be structured and utilized for managing these 
uncertainties. The proposed real options valuation model should be expanded 
in order to incorporate various other options designed to manage various 
uncertainties in the BOT projects. 
2. In this research a novel approach for estimation of the project volatility, which 
is one of the critical parameters in valuation of real options, was devised. 
Nevertheless, research on more accurate models that can characterize the 
annual growth rate of AADT and the annual volatility of AADT is still needed. 
The current traffic models do not provide accurate projections of future 
demand. Also, they are generally unable to provide an insight into the 
uncertainty margin that exists around these projections. Therefore, research 
should focus on appropriate traffic models that incorporate relevant socio-






the probabilities attached to these possible outcomes in an appropriate fashion. 
The real options model created in this research can benefit from these traffic 
models since they can facilitate more accurate estimation of critical input 
values including the annual growth rate of AADT and the annual volatility of 
AADT. 
3. In Chapter 5, the barriers to the adoption and use of real options in the 
transportation infrastructure systems development and management were 
identifies. These barriers have limited real options in the transportation 
development and management discipline and thus, hindered the realization of 
benefits of real options such as improvements in project performance and 
value. The barriers can be overcome by focusing the further research on 
improving current real options pricing models so that they could better reflect 
the characteristics of infrastructure development projects and the current 
managerial practices in the infrastructure development discipline. Moreover, 
research should focus on developing tool and methods that help improving the 
options thinking skills of practitioners. If successful, this thread of research will 
promote the adoption of real options as an analytical tool, a mode of thinking, a 
strategic tool and an organizational process. 
4. The application of the real options model can be expanded to the valuation of 
Public-Private Partnership transportation projects in which the government 
grants a private entity the exclusive rights to operate and maintain an existing 
facility over a long period in accordance with performance requirements set out 






information is available concerning the historical demand levels. Nevertheless, 
the value of investment is still subject to uncertainty due to the uncertain 
performance and deterioration of the facility. The body of knowledge in the 
modeling of the uncertain behavior of transportation infrastructure is growing 
(Durango-Cohen and Madanat 2002; Durango-Cohen and Madanat 2007; 
Guillaumot et al. 2003). There is a unique opportunity to expand the real 
options model presented in this research in order to incorporate the uncertainty 
about the behavior of transportation infrastructure as well as the statistical 
models for transportation infrastructure maintenance and management. This 
thread of research can lead to the development of appropriate models for the 
valuation and identification of optimal operation and maintenance strategies for 
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